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Abstract
Only a small share of employers in high-wage locations procure services from abroad. We document
heterogeneous employer adoption of an online labor market that facilitates trade in tasks with global
workers. Job vacancies posted by experienced employers who have adopted the market are twice as
likely to be filled, and this difference is unrelated to the set of available job applicants or their wages.
Instead, hiring demand from experienced employers shifts outward for two reasons that we identify
using exogenous variation in workers’ wage bids. First, their value for hiring in the market increases—a
form of learning-by-doing. Second, experienced employers omit the low-value employers who leave the
market. Employers appear to learn their value for online hiring only by trying it out, and new employers’
adoption decisions are relatively insensitive to wage rates. Larger firms have lower estimated values for
the market. The results suggest that employers’ willingness to fragment and outsource production at
the task level, rather than the quality of the available online workforce, limits the growth of the gig
economy.
∗A previous version of this paper was circulated with the title ”Experience Markets: An Application to Outsourcing
and Hiring.” We thank seminar participants at the AEA Meetings, the CEPR Workshop on Incentives, Management and
Organisation, Chicago Booth, Columbia, Copenhagen Business School, ESSEC, Harvard, HBS, LMU, LSE, Mannheim, NBER
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along with Ajay Agrawal, Ricardo Alonso, Nava Ashraf, Heski Bar-Isaac, Zoe Cullen, David de Meza, Ricard Gil, John
Horton, Fabian Lange, Lisa Kahn, Bill Kerr, Ed Lazear, Jin Li, Rocco Macchiavello, Kristof Madarasz, Arnaud Maurel,
Ramana Nanda, Amanda Pallais, Luis Rayo, Yona Rubinstein, Scott Schaefer, Kathryn Shaw, Andrei Shleifer, and Nathan
Seegert for helpful comments.
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1 Introduction
Technological change has enlarged the set of feasible relationships between firms and workers, permitting
the increase in alternative work arrangements that have come to be known as the “gig” economy. Online
labor market platforms are a prominent form of information and communications technology for finding,
hiring, and managing task-based contractors (Autor, 2001). Early commentators forecast such platforms
would herald the death of distance as a barrier to the global allocation of jobs that do not require co-located
production (Cairncross, 1997). However, much like the relatively slow growth of the domestic gig economy
(Katz and Krueger, 2019), and despite the technical feasibility of offshoring many jobs, the growth of
remote online hiring has fallen far short of early predictions. In the 2012 Survey of U.S. Business Owners,
only 1.36% of firms reported offshoring any services or functions abroad.1 This paper studies demand and
supply in one of the largest online labor markets to shed light on why the globalization of labor services
has lagged early expectations.
Using data on over 80,000 employers who posted job vacancies between 2008 and 2010, we study
employers’ decisions to adopt online hiring. Sixty-three percent of new employers never hire a worker after
posting at least one job vacancy, 35% hire for one job but do not return to post any future vacancies,
and 25% adopt the hiring technology, meaning they hire at least once and return to post additional
tasks. The key to our empirical approach is that job-level hiring processes and outcomes differ with
employer experience. In particular, employers with prior hiring experience are twice as likely to fill a
vacancy compared to employers who have not hired before. Analyzing these differences allows us to
distinguish between the possible reasons why only 25% of employers who try it end up adopting the
platform. Understanding employers’ relatively limited platform adoption is informative about gig economy
hiring, and, more broadly, about whether technological improvements in contracting will lead traditional
employers to adopt task-level contracting outside the firm (Coase, 1937).
We consider two channels for explaining low adoption that come from employer demand. The first
possibility is that employers’ value for this platform is lower than anticipated, meaning most employers
conclude online hiring does not meet their needs. A second possibility is that the benefits from online hiring
accrue only after a period of learning about how to use the platform. In these demand-based explanations,
the wage savings that attract employers to online hiring are not sufficient to overcome offsetting factors
that make early online hiring costlier than other alternatives.
1This is despite the fact that hourly wages differ by up to a factor of 10 for similar workers in high-wage cities in the US
and, for example, in India (Payscale.com). The combined annual gross revenue of the two largest online hiring platforms is
currently less than $5 billion. While services have long-been viewed as ”nontradeables,” (Blinder and Krueger, 2013) suggest
that around 25% of all services industry jobs can now be performed remotely, enabled for the most part by new technology.
Low observed US imports of services trade hence suggests there are ”missing” services imports from labor-abundant, low-wage,
countries, similar to (Trefler, 1995).
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The supply side offers different explanations for low adoption rates, particularly if new employers have
difficulty attracting applicants. Prior studies of online labor markets show new workers face market entry
barriers due to incomplete information about their quality (Pallais, 2014; Stanton and Thomas, 2016;
Agrawal, Lacetera, and Lyons, 2016). We consider whether analogous problems exist for employers, where
workers are unwilling to supply labor to new employers. Our analysis reveals whether the platform can
increase adoption rates with tweaks to labor supply and by encouraging employer learning-by-doing on
the platform, or if demand for gig-level production is low for reasons that are beyond the platform’s direct
control.
Three institutional features of this market shape our approach to distinguishing between demand-
and supply-based explanations for low adoption rates. First, job vacancies are for a single role or position,
meaning that the employer hires either one candidate or none (Lazear, Shaw, and Stanton, 2018).2 Second,
job candidates bid an hourly wage when applying for a job, and the bid can be thought of as a take-it-or-
leave-it offer. Third, workers can observe whether employers have previously hired, as well as any bilateral
feedback scores given to prior workers or left for the employer. Using strategies to exploit exogenous
variation in wage bids, we model employer hiring decisions as discrete choices from the set of job applicants
and the option to not hire.
To understand demand, we use a simple static discrete choice hiring model in which we allow the
parameters to vary with an employer’s experience in the market. In our setup, an employer’s utility
for choosing to hire a worker includes a heterogeneous employer preference for online hiring relative to
his outside option. His utility for any particular worker also includes functions of worker characteristics,
including wage bids, and job attributes, with parameters that potentially vary based on the employer’s
prior hiring experience. The demand-driven difference between experienced and inexperienced employers
in the propensity to use the platform is revealed in the difference in the utility of online hiring between
all new employers and the selected set of employers who become experienced. Variation in wages and
candidate characteristics allow us to separate learning-by-doing from the selection of the highest-value
employers into becoming experienced.
To account for the potential endogeneity of wage bids, we use Petrin and Train’s (2010) control function
approach with a set of instrumental variables. The main instrument exploits the fact that all contracts are
denominated in US dollars but, because applicants are globally distributed, their oﬄine consumption and
employment opportunities are denominated in their local currency. Exogenous exchange rate fluctuations
serve as an opportunity cost shock, affecting workers’ willingness to supply labor to the platform. A second
instrument, based on variation in the expected competitiveness of a job opening, shifts wage bids for all
2The technology therefore permits trading in tasks, or fragments of a production process, as discussed in (Grossman and
Rossi-Hansberg, 2008).
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workers, including those from workers located in countries with dollar-linked currencies. This instrument
captures the intensity of applications to jobs in the same job category and time period—information that
is available to potential applicants. The combination of these instruments provides plausibly exogenous
variation in both the relative bids between job applicants and in the level of bids for all applicants relative
to an employer’s outside option.
We find the average utility from hiring a worker on the platform differs significantly between inexpe-
rienced and experienced employers—a shift in labor demand that explains almost all of the difference in
hiring propensity between the two groups. Translating utility differences into a money metric, we show
inexperienced employers would require a wage bid reduction of around 30%, which is equivalent to a
reduction of about $2.80 per hour, to bring their hiring propensity up to the experienced employer level.
The difference between inexperienced and experienced employers’ demand for hiring is due to both
selection and learning-by-doing. First, new employers include employers with low valuations. Employers
who adopt online hiring are a selected sample of all potential employers—those that have relatively high
valuations for finding remote workers. We parameterize the distributions of heterogeneity using a finite
mixture model, allowing the type probabilities to differ based on whether the employer is observed to adopt
the hiring technology by entering the experienced employer sample. Our estimates of employer type have
a higher mean among experienced employers, with substantially less probability weight on the lowest type,
consistent with positive selection into adopting the platform.
Because all employers appear in the data by posting jobs, it is their early experiences with the platform
that are likely revealing to them whether online hiring is a good fit with their needs, and they select out
of the market when it is not. This characteristic is conceptually similar to Nelson’s (1970) definition of
Experience Goods as goods that consumers can evaluate only through trial. We propose that this platform
itself can be viewed analogously as an Experience Market, in which employers learn how the market
compares to their outside alternative only after trying it out. We note that online hiring requires an
employer to undertake various activities in addition to finding a worker, including fragmenting production
to the task level, and coordinating online and oﬄine production. The costs of these requirements are
plausibly unknown prior to trial. In our preferred specification, differences in the composition of employers
in the market account for around one third of the difference in hiring utility between inexperienced and
experienced employers.
The learning-by-doing channel is captured by the extent to which the typical experienced employer’s
own value for the workers on the platform has shifted out compared to the same employer’s value while
inexperienced, increasing his propensity to hire. This comparison is a revealed preference approach rather
than a direct estimate of productivity improvements with experience as in Levitt, List, and Syverson (2013).
The shift in hiring propensity may be driven by employers learning to better manage remote contractors,
to tailor their job postings, or to incorporate remote contractors into their existing production process.
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Learning-by-doing explains around two-thirds of the change in hiring utility between inexperienced and
experienced employers.
The estimates of the hiring model also yield a finding that may be surprising at first glance: Given that
experienced employers are more likely to hire for any job, one might expect these employers to have less
wage elastic hiring demand. However, we find experienced employers’ demand for individual job candidates
appears to rotate, making their hiring probability for a given worker more elastic with respect to hourly
wage bids. In line with this finding, and interpreting wage bids as equilibrium outcomes in the worker’s
response to employer experience-specific labor demand, we find that workers include lower markups in
their bids to experienced employers and wage bids fall with employer experience. We present summary
statistics suggesting that this changing elasticity with experience is due to experienced employers’ having
accumulated knowledge of a stock of prior applicants that may be recalled on future jobs, increasing the
degree of latent competition for a slot.
On the supply side, little evidence suggests that workers avoid applying to inexperienced employers or
increase their wage bids to these employers because they anticipate greater costs on the job. The most
plausible supply-related costs associated with inexperienced employers relate to their lack of reputation
and the potential for receiving poor job-related feedback from them. However, experienced employers who
have received good feedback from workers, or who have left good feedback for their prior hires, receive wage
bids that are higher than the wage bids to other experienced employers, which runs counter to the notion
that employer reputation lowers workers’ costs. To assess the extent of unobserved changes in workers’
expected costs, possibly arising from unobserved changes in how employers describe jobs, we conducted a
small field experiment in which we posted identical jobs when inexperienced and experienced employers.
Labor supply patterns in these experimental jobs match the observational data.
Armed with our model estimates, we return to ask whether platform policies might encourage additional
adoption of this hiring technology for those who try it out. For example, subsidizing hiring may change
the extent to which uncertain employers gather information about their own type. We ask whether the
platform would find reducing the wage bids that new employers face to be profitable. Our counterfactuals
show the platform would have actually earned significantly lower profits had it reduced wage bids to new
employers.3 Although relative subsidies to the inexperienced would increase the share of employers that
adopt the platform, because of the relative wage inelasticity of new employers shown in our labor demand
estimates, those induced to hire by a subsidy would not go on to hire enough in the future to recover
the up-front reduced platform revenue from instituting lower fees.4 The counterfactuals reveal that the
3These conclusions are robust to whether employers are assumed to be forward looking, anticipating changes in future
platform fees, or myopic.
4In our preferred specification, the probability with which new employers hire has an elasticity with respect to a uniform
wage change of−2.93. Failing to account for the greater heterogeneity in employer types among the inexperienced, and selection
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challenge of finding the right worker at the right wage cannot explain low adoption rates.
What do our results tell us about the potential size of the market for online labor services? Whereas we
find significant learning-by-doing gains from experience in the market, most new potential employers in our
sample learn they prefer alternative hiring option to adopting online hiring. Moreover, this preference is
relatively insensitive to the wage bids offered.5 We note that the employers using this platform to contract
at arm’s length must first fragment production into tasks that an individual worker can complete, and
then must coordinate with these workers at arm’s length. These costs are employer specific and are likely
borne by the employer in local wages. Hence, the subsidies offered by the platform in our counterfactuals
do not affect them.
The natural next question is why online hiring works for some employers but not for others. The data
include limited information about employers, but we do observe employer size and geography. Projecting
our posterior estimate of each employer’s heterogeneous value for online hiring on employer size indicators
and location fixed effects yields few differences by employer geography. However, our analysis reveals
significant heterogeneity in employer value for the market as a function of firm size. Value for online
hiring is negatively correlated with the number of internal employees at the firm. Conditional on posting
a job, firms with many internal workers are more likely to conclude they prefer to use their alternative
labor sources rather than online hiring on this platform.6 Size may indicate a high cost of fragmenting
production to the task level or of integrating and coordinating outsourced work with other parts of a firm’s
production process, especially if large firms have more complex or bureaucratic processes. Large firms
may alternatively be more likely to have substitute internal labor capacity, making the platform relatively
less appealing. Although we don’t have direct evidence on why large firms are the least likely to adopt
this platform after trying it out, the correlation with firm size supports our finding that adoption relates
to variation in the value of an employer’s outside option, and not to variation in employers’ experiences
within the platform. We infer that low adoption of globalized online hiring, then, can be attributed to
employer-specific costs of fragmenting production and coordinating with individual online contractors at
out, would have led us to overestimate the inexperienced wage elasticity of vacancy fill, at −4.10. We would have then, in
turn, overestimated the responsiveness of adoption to new employer subsidies. Our preferred estimate of the vacancy fill rate
wage elasticity among experienced employers is −4.03. That is, experienced employers are more elastic than inexperienced
employers once the latter group’s relative heterogeneity is taken into account.
5Furthermore, we expect that our sample encompasses only the higher-tail segment of the platform value distribution
because we don’t observe employers who don’t try out the platform during this time period.
6This negative association is in stark contrast to the strong positive association between firm size and propensity to engage
in international trade that has been documented in many settings (Bernard, Jensen, Redding, and Schott, 2007; Halpern,
Koren, and Szeidl, 2015; Antras, Fort, and Tintelnot, 2017). Recent models of importing typically assume only large firms
have the scale to realize sufficient variable cost savings from importing to offset the fixed costs of doing so. In our setting, the
single worker-task-level contracting environment doesn’t allow any employer scale benefits.
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arm’s length.
Stepping beyond our specific context, we highlight the general implications of our approach for the study
of new markets. If a market is very different from buyers’ existing alternatives, it is quite plausible that
many users need to engage in trial to learn whether it is valuable to them. Hence, new demand will include
potential buyers whose value for the market is revealed to be negative ex-post. Our analysis demonstrates
the importance of accounting for how heterogeneity in value for these Experience Markets affects the
composition of users. In our application, had we failed to account for changing type heterogeneity as
employers gain experience and select out, we would have overestimated the price elasticity on the extensive
margin of the market-adoption decision, disguising the real barriers that buyers face when entering a
market.
The paper proceeds as follows: Section 2 introduces the data and the empirical context. Section
3 describes the hiring probability estimation strategy. Section 4 presents and interprets the estimation
results for inexperienced and experienced employers. Section 5 contains reduced-form results related to
wage bids and hiring processes. Section 6 is the counterfactual analysis. Section 7 concludes.
2 The Setting, Data, and Summary Statistics
2.1 oDesk.com: How It Works
oDesk.com is an online platform that allows employers to contract with remote workers who sell labor
services.7 The platform facilitates search and matching, remote task management, and payments. Work
includes a range of jobs in which output can be delivered electronically, and the most frequently observed job
categories are Web Development and Administrative Support. Jobs tend to be short-term spot transactions,
with the majority of postings requiring less than three months of work. Around 85% of the transactions
in the market span international borders, with the worker typically located in the lower-wage country.
An employer who wants to purchase online labor services creates an account on the platform, with no
upfront charge. To post a job opening, the employer must select the job’s work category and its expected
duration, give the job a title, and describe the work to be done and the necessary skills. Once the posting
is in the system, potential applicants learn about the job by searching on the site or through automatic
7See Horton (2010) for an overview of how online labor markets work, and Agrawal, Horton, Lacetera, and Lyons (2015)
and Horton, Kerr, and Stanton (2017) for stylized facts about patterns of contracting, especially between different countries,
in these markets. The market we study has features and characteristics similar to other prominent platforms, which at the
time of our sample included eLance and Guru. eLance merged with oDesk in 2014, and the merged company was re-named
Upwork.com. The data used in this paper pre-date the merger. Most papers using data from online labor markets focus on
workers’ careers (Agrawal, Lacetera, and Lyons, 2016; Lyons, 2017; Ghani, Kerr, and Stanton, 2014; Pallais, 2014; Stanton
and Thomas, 2016). The main exceptions are Horton (2017a) and Horton (2017b), which examine matching under different
platform policies.
notification. Like the example in Figure 1, the postings contain information about the employer and
the job. The employer’s experience in the market (in the bottom right corner: “About the Client”) is
prominently displayed, allowing potential applicants to learn it before submitting their application.
Figure 1: A Job Posting.
Interested workers submit applications for the job posting and bid an hourly wage to work on the specific
job. Employers also have the option to search worker profiles directly and invite applications. Workers’
profiles contain information about their skills, education, prior oﬄine work experience, and experience on
oDesk (see Figure 2). Workers are located worldwide, and the profiles of workers with prior experience on
the site show summary feedback scores received from past work on a 5-point scale.
After receiving applications and inviting workers to apply, employers can request interviews with any
number of candidates for the job. If the applicant agrees, the interview usually takes place via Skype.8 An
employer may choose to hire an applicant with or without interviewing her first.
After hiring a worker, the employer can monitor work via software provided by oDesk, and oDesk
manages all payments for completed work. When a job is complete, the employer is asked for feedback
about the worker and vice versa. The employer is also asked whether the job was completed successfully. In
other contexts, having a market reputation or having received good feedback mitigates payment risk, but
oDesk guarantees workers are paid for the hours billed. Thus, payments and payment risk are unrelated
to employer reputation or experience.
8The data record interview requests and the applicant’s response to the request. Whether an interview actually occurs is
not recorded in the oDesk database, so the remainder of this paper refers to an accepted interview request as an interview.
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Figure 2: A Worker Profile.
The data used in this paper are administrative data from oDesk. In the data, we observe every
employer’s job-specific search process in each of his successive job postings. For each posting, the data
contain information about the entire applicant pool; which candidates, if any, are interviewed; which
candidate, if any, is hired; and the feedback and success measures that the employer leaves for the hired
worker, and vice versa.
2.2 Summary Statistics by Employer Experience
The data contain job postings and applications between January 2008 and June 2010: 82, 257 potential
employers posted 322, 870 job openings, and more than 5 million job applications were made. There are
nine job categories in the data. Web Development, the largest technical job category, accounts for 38% of
all job postings, followed by Software Development, which accounts for 9%. Administrative Support is the
largest non-technical category, with 17% of the postings.9
Most employers are located in the US and range from private individuals to those hiring within large
firms. From the limited information on employers collected by the company, firm size is known for 20,395
9Other job categories are: Design and Multimedia, Writing and Translation, Sales and Marketing, Business Services,
Networking and Information Systems, and Customer Service.
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employers. Of these, 34% are private individuals or sole proprietors, 51% have between two and nine
workers, and the remaining 15% have more than 10 in-house employees. Applicants do not see external
information about an employer—only the employer’s location and past oDesk platform activity are ob-
servable when applying for a job, as displayed in Figure 1. On each job posting, workers can observe any
feedback that employers have received from previous workers, as well as the number of past hires by the
employer and the total hours billed. Figure 3 presents the distribution of the number of hires per employer
throughout the period. Sixty-three percent of the potential employers posting jobs hire no applicants at
all, whereas 17% make five or more hires.
Figure 3: Number of Hires per Employer
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The unit of analysis is an employer. Total hires are censored at 30.
Table 1 summarizes the job openings in the data for two samples. Summary statistics are displayed
separately by the number of previous hires made by the employer. Columns 1 to 5 report statistics for all
job posts in the sample. Columns 6 to 10 restrict to what we term the sequential, arms-length sample—a
subset of all job postings that we use for the hiring probability estimation in Section 3. This sample imposes
some restrictions that are necessary to ensure features of the hiring processes observed in the data can be
mapped into an employer choice problem conditional on a set of applicants. Some employers hire multiple
workers simultaneously by posting a batch of jobs all at the same time; therefore, how to determine the
set of applicants across job posts is unclear. Other difficulties include employers bringing workers onto the
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platform or targeting workers whom they have hired in the past. We restrict to job openings with at least
one worker-initiated application, which had multiple applicants to consider, and then had a gap of at least
one day before or after the same employer posted a different opening.10
In both samples in Table 1, hiring behavior differs significantly based on the employer’s experience at the
time of posting a job. Only 22% (16% among sequential openings) of openings posted by new employers
result in a hire (Columns 5 and 10).11 Experienced employers are far more likely than inexperienced
employers to hire on a given job post. Among employers with at least four prior hires, 57% (28%) hire a
worker.
Table 1 also provides summary statistics on wage bids and application counts. Columns 4 and 9 indicate
wage bids fall with employer experience. We note that wage bids reflect workers’ anticipated costs when
applying for a job and also capture markups in excess of costs. Differences in bids with employer experience
could then be due to cost factors or a consequence of demand changes that alter optimal markups. Table
1 sheds some preliminary light on whether the supply side differs by employer experience by looking at
patterns of applications. Raw counts of job candidates decline with employer experience in the overall
sample and increase slightly with experience in the sequential sample, suggesting the ease of attracting
applicants is unlikely to explain the stark difference in hiring rates. Rates of employer-initiated candidacies
are similar across experience levels.
Table 2 shows an employer’s experience does not meaningfully alter the characteristics of the candidates
who apply. The columns display data on the average characteristics of applicants for job openings posted
by employers with different numbers of past hires. Comparing the means and standard deviations across
the first five columns of the table shows the applicant pools are similar except for the hourly wage bids.
The second set of five columns then repeats this exercise with the characteristics of the workers whom
employers ultimately hire. Across employer experience levels, we find no major differences in resume
characteristics among the workers who are hired. This summary evidence suggests little sorting across
applications by employers’ experience, casting doubt on the hypothesis that inexperienced employers have
difficulty attracting applicants on the extensive margin.
Comparing hired workers with all applicants across columns, Table 2 also shows employers are selective,
because the characteristics of hired workers differ from the other applicants. We now turn to estimating
how employers evaluate worker characteristics relative to wage bids.
10See Appendix 1 and Appendix Table A1 for additional details about sample composition. Of the 119, 877 jobs posted
by inexperienced employers, 61, 160 survive these restrictions, yielding 109, 764 total job openings across employer experience
levels.
11We note some employers post multiple jobs before making any hire, but 63% of employers never hire on any job post.
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3 Employer Hiring Decisions
Before specifying a model of hiring, we provide motivating evidence with a figure showing how employers
with different experience levels select individual workers at different wage bids. Each of the four panels in
Figure 4 contains applicant hiring probabilities for a different job category, plotting the empirical proba-
bility of the applicant being chosen as a function of the residual wage bid. In each panel, the experienced
employers’ hiring probability function is shifted outward, and the slopes also differ by employer experience.
Experienced employers tend to be more likely to hire a given worker at any residual wage bid, and they
also appear to have more elastic hiring probabilities over the range of residual bids that are most common
in the data. This finding suggests both the probability of hire at a residual bid and the sensitivity of
the choice probability to the bid vary with employer experience. We now turn to a model that formally
captures these relationships in the data.
Figure 4: Residual Hiring Probability as a Function of Residual Bids
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The unit of analysis is a job application. Wage bids and hiring probabilities are residualized within each job category using
the worker resume data observed by the employer, a spline for the application number, and a linear time trend. Points are
taken from a polynomial smoothing function of the residual hiring indicator on the residual bid.
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3.1 The Employer’s Problem
To examine shifts in hiring probabilities and different sensitivities to bids by experience, we specify a
modified conditional logit hiring probability function with employer-experience-specific parameters. For
employer i with experience χ on job opening o, the probability that applicant j is hired for the job is
denoted by piχoj . Our goal is to estimate piχoj as a function of the worker’s wage bid wiχoj
12 and resume
characteristics and job characteristics, Xoj .
13 The subscript o for the job opening indicates that the
probability that applicant j is hired is related to the set of all applicants for a particular job (Lazear,
Shaw, and Stanton, 2018). In addition, we allow piχoj to be a function of employer i’s value of hiring any
worker on the platform, µi, which can be heterogeneous across employers.
An employer’s objective is to choose the best applicant out of Jio, the set of applicants for an opening,
or choose not to hire for this job on the platform.14 Because the employer is looking for a single worker, he
chooses the worker who produces the most or has the highest quality per unit of wage. Quality consists of
observable characteristics about the worker in the matrix Xoj , an experience-dependent parameter vector
βχ, the employer’s heterogeneous value for hiring on the platform, µi, and an error term, εoj . The option
of hiring no worker means the best worker’s ratio of quality to wage must be greater than the value of
the off-platform option, denoted option zero, for the employer to make a hire. The employer’s objective
function is then
max
j∈{Jio,0}
{
max
j∈{Jio}
exp (Xojβχ + µi + εoj)
(wiχoj)
αχ , exp (εo0)
}
.
The errors εoj and εo0 are assumed to be an idiosyncratic type-1 extreme value shock for each alternative
worker j and for the outside option, with location and scale normalized. The parameter αχ scales the
importance of wage bids relative to the extreme value errors while partially determining the elasticity of
hiring with respect to wages. We note the term µi does not appear in the payoff to the outside option,
because this term is part of the employer’s payoff from hiring any worker on the platform.
12Consistent with institutional detail about this setting, we assume the wage bid is a take-it-or-leave-it offer. Bargaining
between the first offered wage and the starting wage for hired candidates appears to happen very infrequently. See Appendix
2 for additional detail.
13The matrix Xoj includes many of the details observable in a worker’s profile, including feedback, country, past hours
worked, and past compensation history (Barach and Horton, 2017). Job categories and the expected duration of work are
among the characteristics included for jobs.
14Workers are assumed to be available when they initiate an application. This assumption is reasonable, requiring only that
the probability that a worker will receive two offers over a short time interval is small. Although we do not observe declined
job offers, only 0.6% of the worker days in the sample have more than two interview requests arriving. A post-candidacy
survey also asks employers for reasons particular workers were not hired and asks workers their reasons for exiting the active
candidate set. In some cases, employers or workers explicitly report a realized scheduling conflict. We drop cases of reported
scheduling conflicts or when workers refuse invited applications.
13
Taking logs of the employer’s objective yields an inequality expressing that worker j is hired by employer
i with experience χ when
Xojβχ + µi + εoj − αχ log (wiχoj) ≥ Xokβχ + µi + εik − αχ log (wiχok) (1)
for all k ∈ {Jio, 0}. Conditional on µi, the probability that inequality (1) holds takes a conditional logit
form, with
piχoj = exp (Xojβχ + µi − αχ log (wiχoj)) /(
1 + ΣJioj exp (Xojβχ + µi − αχ log (wiχoj))
)
. (2)
The parameter vector βχ that specifies the relationship between hiring value and job and applicant
characteristics Xoj has an employer experience subscript, allowing employers with different experience
to weigh resume characteristics differently. In addition, αχ allows the sensitivity of wage bids to vary
by experience. These features allow both the baseline hiring probability and the wage bid elasticity to
vary with experience. Because µi shifts employer i’s value of hiring any applicant, this term does not
alter his relative ranking over applicants for a given job, but it does determine the value of hiring any
applicant versus not hiring in the market.15 The presence of µi in the hiring probability function relaxes a
well-known limitation of standard conditional logit models—the independence of irrelevant alternatives or
IIA assumption—allowing for different substitution patterns between the no-hire option and the available
candidates in the choice set.
Identification is straightforward conditional on µi. If µi were fully observable to the researcher for
each employer, variation in wages, applicant characteristics, and choices would identify the parameters
up to location and scale using standard arguments. Because each employer’s µi is unobserved, only the
population distribution of types can be identified. For example, if some employers repeatedly hire when
faced with low-quality applicants who submit high bids, whereas other employers do not hire when high-
quality workers with low bids are available, the estimated population distribution of µ types would have a
wide dispersion in valuations.
We require a specification that is sufficiently flexible to capture differences that arise from employer
selection versus changes in the underlying parameters that describe how employers assess workers and hir-
ing opportunities. This requirement motivates an estimation approach that measures the extent to which
the employers who return to the market after hiring once are a non-random sample from the population
distribution of µ.We use a finite mixture model to allow for the flexibility to accommodate an arbitrary dis-
tribution of employer types that may change due to selection. Because the distribution among experienced
employers is likely to truncate the lower tail of µ, assuming symmetry of the type distribution or stability
15Flexibility in the parameters by experience adjusts scaling relative to the variance of the unobserved type-1 extreme value
shock.
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of the distribution would not account for employer selection. In our preferred specification, employer types
are fixed, but we allow the type probabilities to depend on whether the employer is ever observed to post
jobs while experienced. Thus, we assume returning employers are drawn from a distribution with the same
latent support as the distribution for the inexperienced employers, but with different probability weights
at each support point.
All employers who gain experience undergo the same shift in preference parameters due to experience,
because βχ does not have a type subscript. This allows a simple partition between learning-by-doing and
selection.16 The mean of the distribution of employer valuations can change as employers gain experience,
because Xoj has a constant term and βχ is an experience-specific parameter vector. The distribution of
µi is centered around the constant term in βχ, and shifts in the constant term with experience reflect all
employers’ gains from experience. Allowing different type probabilities on µi for employers whom we ever
observe posting jobs after gaining experience captures employer selection. The parameters are identified
using variation in employers’ choice sets and exogenous variation in wage bids.
3.2 Instruments and Identification
Worker applications contain unobserved information that may be correlated with wage bids. We address
potential correlation of the error and wage bids through an instrumental variables strategy that is based on
the assumption that wage bids are determined in part by worker costs, including the opportunity cost of
online work. We use changes in the dollar-to-local-currency exchange rate for the applicant’s country as an
exogenous opportunity cost shifter. Workers are paid in their local currency for oﬄine work, but they are
paid in US dollars for their work on oDesk. Frictions limiting exchange rate pass-through to local wages
mean oﬄine opportunities are likely to adjust to exchange rates more slowly than online transactions.17
When the local currency appreciates relative to the dollar, so that one dollar earned on the site provides
fewer local currency units, workers’ wage bids are predicted to increase.
Figure 5 illustrates the time-series variation in mean residual log wage bids and exchange rates that
underpins this instrumental variables approach. We focus on India, which is the largest source country for
workers. The top left panel plots the mean residual log wage bid for job applicants located in India and
the log of the US dollar to Indian rupee exchange rate. To control for secular trends and level differences
in local exchange rates across countries, we detrend each series and remove its time series mean. The
mean bid and exchange rate time series move together. The other panels in Figure 5 focus on relative
16We also experimented with more complicated models in which the parameters have a more general dependence on em-
ployers’ type, but this added complexity did little for model fit while adding a large number of additional parameters. These
specifications show selection out of market is not related to preferences for worker characteristics or sensitivity to wages.
17This potential source of variation was revealed in conversations with employers who mentioned the frequency with which
exchange rate calculators appear in the screenshots taken by oDesk’s monitoring software.
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bid variation across source countries as a function of local exchange rate differences. These panels plot
the difference between the mean of residualized bids from applicants in India and those from applicants in
five other common worker locations (the dots in the figures). The crosses in the remaining panels display
differences in the local currency and the Indian rupee exchange rate. These figures indicate that exchange
rate variation across applicant countries induces variation across applicants’ wage bids.18
Figure 5: Mean Residual Log Bids and Detrended Exchange Rates.
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The top left panel plots mean residual log bids against the log of the US Dollar to Indian Rupee exchange rate after removing
a time trend. The remaining panels plot log bid differences between India and other countries (left y-axis) and the log of other
currency to the Indian exchange rate (right y-axis).
Although exchange rate movements are plausibly exogenous to demand on oDesk, several additional
issues are relevant for identification. First, a subset of job applicants—those based in the US or living in
countries with dollar-pegged exchange rates—do not face any cost shocks from this instrument. This issue is
not a problem for comparisons between workers, because other applicants will have exchange rate variation,
shifting relative bids. However, these applicants have no variation relative to the employer’s outside option
18Each panel is based on differing numbers of observations; Indian workers are about 40% of the sample, whereas Russians
and Ukrainians submit under 3% of the total observed bids.
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of not hiring. We construct a second instrument for bids that is relevant to all workers, including those
with dollar or dollar-pegged local currencies. This instrument captures exogenous variation in the intensity
of competition for a vacancy. The ideal variation would alter the extent of perceived competition by other
applicants, embodied by situations in which, for example, a subset of potential applicants randomly lost
internet access and this supply shock was observable to applicants who remained available. The instrument
is based on a similar idea, exploiting the fact that workers can observe counts of other applicants to jobs.
We leverage the extent of competition for jobs in the same category and week as a measure of likely
competition for the job in question. We calculate the instrument using the leave-own-opening-out average
of the number of job applications in the first 24 hours since posting for the category-by-week cell. This
instrument is close to the ideal instrument because potential applicants can observe how many competitors
are applying using platform-specific dashboards that summarize openings in a job category. However, the
exclusion restriction is vulnerable to demand shocks or time series variation in market conditions. To
mitigate these potential violations of the identifying assumptions, we remove job category and time fixed
effects. The residuals after removing these fixed effects do not contain time-series variation in the number
of jobs or applicants; instead, they capture competition differences across job types in the same week while
holding fixed the average competition in the category over time and the average competition across all job
categories during the week in question.
An additional concern is that the instruments themselves may influence the composition of workers
who apply. For example, an appreciation of a local exchange rate may lead a non-random set of potential
applicants to seek work elsewhere. Assessing the sensitivity of the parameter estimates to the inclusion
of different sets of observable worker characteristics offers some insight into whether worker selection into
application biases the estimates. For this reason, we include a comparison of the first stage and demand
estimates with and without worker-level resume data. This approach allows an assessment of whether
worker observable characteristics are correlated with the instruments and enables us to comment on the
direction of bias in the demand estimates that may result from unobserved correlation.
To make use of the variation in bids induced by the instruments, we use Petrin and Train’s (2010)
control function approach, putting the two worker-level instruments, Zoj , and worker characteristics, Xoj ,
in a first stage regression of the form
log(wioj) = γ0 + Zojγ1χ +Xojγ2χ + νiχoj . (3)
The coefficients in Equation 3 are estimated separately for the group of new and experienced employers.
Later, we derive this first stage as the worker’s optimal bid from her supply problem. For additional detail,
see Footnote 28.
The results in Table 3 show that both instruments have a substantive and statistically significant effect
on workers’ bids. The first column provides estimates for inexperienced employers, including many resume
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and job controls. Column 2 provides the analogous estimates for experienced employers. The signs of the
estimated coefficients are as expected. Bids increase when the local exchange rate increases and decrease
with the level of competition on the job. In both cases, the F statistics are extremely large, indicating the
strength of the instruments. Columns 3 and 4 exclude the detailed worker resume data—those columns
of Xoj in Equation 3 that contain worker characteristics. A comparison of the estimated γ1 coefficients
between those given in the first and second pairs of columns provides some evidence about the extent of
sorting on the instrument. Under the null of no sorting, the estimated parameters in Columns 1 and 3 and in
Columns 2 and 4 would be statistically indistinguishable. The estimated parameters are larger in absolute
magnitude in the columns that exclude the worker characteristics, suggesting some sorting into applying
occurs.19 Later, estimation of the hiring probability function with and without worker characteristics will
help us understand how this sorting affects the estimates of demand for each employer segment.
3.3 Estimation
This section presents the likelihood over sequences of employer choices across different job posts.20 The
step-by-step approach is as follows. First, the residuals from Equation (3) form control functions for
unobserved worker quality, denoted CFiχoj = νˆiχoj . Second, we form choice probabilities conditional on a
value of the unobserved term µi, taking the form:
piχoj = exp (Xojβχ + µi − αχ log (wioj) + ψχCFiχoj) /(
1 + ΣJij=1 exp (Xojβχ + µi − αχ log (wioj) + ψχCFiχoj)
)
. (4)
Third, we assume µi is drawn from a distribution with three distinct types: µi ∈ {β0χ, β0χ+µ2, β0χ+µ3}.
For the first type, µ1 = β0χ is a constant term that is allowed to vary with employer experience.
21 For
the other two types, the deviation from β0χ remains constant with experience. That is, a type-2 employer,
who hires on the first job and then posts two additional jobs, will have β0χ=I + µ2 prior to hiring and
β0χ=E + µ2 on subsequent openings, where the χ = I and χ = E subscripts refer to the parameters for
the inexperienced and experienced segment, respectively. The values of µ2 and µ3, and the associated type
probabilities, tell us the extent of heterogeneity in value for the market among each employer segment.
19Because many workers submit only a small number of total applications, including measures of worker heterogeneity in the
first stage, or assessing the extent of selection into applications based on exchange rate variation, is hard. Appendix Table A2
contains a sensitivity analysis for the first stage, providing results that from regressions that include job applicant fixed effects.
The instruments remain strong in these specifications. However, we note the residuals from the first stage with applicant fixed
effects cannot be used in estimation due to the incidental parameters problem that arises because control functions including
fixed effects are not the result of a consistent estimator.
20In specifications that omit employer heterogeneity, the likelihood is specified at the job-opening level and µi is set to zero.
21The difference in this term between inexperienced and experienced employers will form our estimate of learning-by-doing,
that is, the increase in the average value for the platform that employers gain from having hired on the site before.
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Fourth, we allow a flexible pattern of selection into becoming experienced by letting the type probabil-
ities depend on the eventual experience of an employer, using the superscript S = E to denote the ever-
experienced group of employers and S = N to denote the never-experienced group. Hence, the type proba-
bility vector for an employer who is ever observed in the experienced sample is ρS=E = (ρS=E1 , ρ
S=E
2 , ρ
S=E
3 ).
The type probability vector for an employer who is never observed in the experienced sample is ρS=N =
(ρS=N1 , ρ
S=N
2 , ρ
S=N
3 ). The type probabilities are invariant within employer, and the estimates of the ρ
parameters tell us how the distribution of employer types varies with the choice to become experienced.
We then form the likelihood, which is defined over sequences of employer choices. The probability of
a sequence for the employer’s choices conditional on µi is the product of the choice probabilities for the
alternatives selected, (y = j). But, because µi is not observed, the marginal likelihood must be used by
summing over the likelihoods for different employer types.22 The marginal likelihood for an employer who
ever posts a job in the experienced segment is the sum over the three types weighted by the probability of
that type:
Li = Σ
3
k=1ρ
S=E
k ΠoΣojpiχoj (µk)
y=j .
The term Σojpiχoj (µk)
y=j is the conditional choice probability for the actual choice made on a particular
job opening, summing across the possible chosen alternatives. We then take the product over the sequence
of choices across job openings for the employer, as the product is taken over o. The type weights differ
depending on whether the employer is observed in the experienced segment, and the likelihood contribution
for employers who are never observed as experienced employers is
Li = Σ
3
k=1ρ
S=N
k ΠoΣojpiχoj (µk)
y=j .
4 Results
4.1 Learning-by-Doing and Selection
The estimates indicate significant changes in demand between inexperienced and experienced employers
due to both learning-by-doing and selection out of the platform. Learning-by-doing suggests experience is
necessary to unlock some benefits of remote hiring, whereas selection out after early experience suggests
employers enter with initial uncertainty about their value for using the market. Table 4 presents the
results for the hiring probability estimation using the sequential openings sample. Panel A displays the
estimated heterogeneity in employer types for never-experienced and ever-experienced employers. Our
preferred specification is in Columns 5 and 6, whereas Columns 1 and 2 present a restricted model without
employer heterogeneity, and Columns 3 and 4 present the model without worker resume characteristics.
Employer types and their corresponding probabilities for the group of employers who don’t return as
22For further details, see Train (2009).
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experienced employers are displayed under columns for inexperienced employers (Columns 3 and 5) and
the ever-experienced are in the columns for experienced employers (Columns 4 and 6).
Figure 6 plots a histogram of employers’ types based on whether the employer is in the ever-experienced
group or the group that is never observed in the experienced sample, and helps to visualize employer
heterogeneity and selection into posting further jobs. This figure uses the parameter estimates in Panel A
of Table 4 as well as the estimated share of employers of each type in each employer group, also given in
Panel A. The µ distribution of employer valuations varies by experience, and a clear pattern of selection
exists, in which type-2 employers, those with low values of µi, are much less likely to be observed in
the ever-experienced group. Thirty-four percent of experienced employers are type 3, the high µi type,
compared to only 9% of those that never return as experienced employers.
Figure 6: Employer Types by Ever-Experienced or Never-Experienced Group
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Type probabilities for employers based on whether they are ever observed in the experienced segment. Employers who are
inexperienced and eventually transition to the experienced segment are always classified using the ”Ever Experienced” type
probabilities.
Quantifying the extent of both learning-by-doing and selection, Panel B of Table 4 provides estimates of
how employer valuations change with experience through a decomposition. We term E(Xoj |χ)βχ+E(µ|χ)
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the log productive value of hiring an applicant with characteristics Xoj for employers with experience χ
and decompose its difference between experienced and inexperienced employers. Differences in the log
productive value of hiring arise due to changes in X, due to changes in β, and due to changes in µ between
job postings by the inexperienced and by the experienced. Changes in X reflect sorting of workers into jobs
or changes in the characteristics of job postings. Changes in β suggest changes in employer perceptions of
the platform or changing weights on applicant characteristics, and changes in µ indicate employer selection
out of the market based on their value of hiring online.
Using the logic of decomposition estimators (Oaxaca, 1973; Blinder, 1973; Fortin, Lemieux, and Firpo,
2011), let I and E subscripts denote the X matrix and parameter vector β for inexperienced employers
and experienced employers, respectively. The difference in log productive value due to differences in X is(
X¯E − X¯I
)
βI , which is the difference in characteristics for the experienced and inexperienced segments
weighted by the inexperienced parameter estimates. Changes in β provide an estimate of the effect of
learning-by-doing, and are given by X¯E (βE − βI) . Finally, the difference due to employer composition—
changes in µ—calculates the mean of the distribution of µ for the inexperienced and experienced segments
(as summarized in Figure 6).23
The difference in log productive values, although easy to calculate, does not have a natural interpre-
tation on its own. Therefore, we translate the difference into units of log wages. To do so, we define W˜
as the equivalent log wage for inexperienced employers that would offset the increase in productive value
achieved by experienced employers. This solves the following equation, in expectation:
E(XEβE + µE − αElog (wijE)) = E(XIβI + µI − αIW˜ ). (5)
This measure captures the log-wage bid reduction to inexperienced employers that would equate the prob-
abilities of hiring a given applicant for experienced and inexperienced employers. It shows substantial
bid-equivalent increases in the value of the market for the experienced. The specification that omits
employer-type heterogeneity (Columns 1 and 2) yields an 11-log-point bid-equivalent increase in employer
value for the platform from experience. When allowing for heterogeneity across employers, we estimate
that inexperienced employers would have to receive bids that were around 30 log points lower to equate
their value for the platform with that of employers with experience. This amount is an average reduction
of about $2.80 per hour, a substantial percentage of average bid levels.
In the models that include worker characteristics, the majority of the change by experience level is due
23For experienced employers, this calculation is straightforward and simply uses the type probabilities for the ever-
experienced group of employers. The openings posted by inexperienced employers include those posted by employers who
never become experienced and those that do. So, for the inexperienced openings, both distributions in Figure 6 are used,
along with a weighted average of type probabilities that corresponds to the fraction of inexperienced employers who eventually
become experienced.
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to changes in the estimated β coefficients—that is, the learning-by-doing effect. Because the worker sorting
effect is negative, at around −11% of the log productive value difference, changes in β and in µ explain
more than 100% of the difference in the productive value of the market for experienced and inexperienced
employers. Seventy-nine percent of the total increase in log productive value, or a wage shift of about
24%, is due to learning-by-doing. Thirty-two percent of the change in log productive value is due to the
employer composition effect of employers with low values of µ selecting out of the market. The employer
composition change is equivalent to a wage shift of about 9%.
Do employer characteristics, unobserved by applicants but visible in the administrative data, explain
the estimated heterogeneity in market value? To answer this question, we first compute the posterior type
of an employer, denoted µˆi, using Bayes’ rule.
24 We then regress µˆi on observable characteristics of the
employer. Some observable employer characteristics, such as geographic location, are populated in the
database for most employers, but other characteristics are contained only in sparse employer surveys. We,
hence, explored several different models: (1) We regressed µˆi on state fixed effects for US-based employers,
asking whether geographic variation contributes to value for the platform. (2) We then reduced the sample
by adding survey information about the headcount of regular workers at the employer’s firm. State fixed
effects lead to a large number of parameters, so we discipline the analysis of across-state heterogeneity
using a LASSO approach with a cross-validated penalty term. Most state fixed effects do not survive the
LASSO; when they do, small cell sizes are responsible. Firm-size dummies remain.
Table 5 presents the results of regressions that capture the spirit of the LASSO exploration, but here
the approach allows for the computation of standard errors. Columns 1 and 2 report a linear probability
model where the dependent variable is that the employer has adopted the market, as indicated by posting
jobs after gaining experience. The coefficients capture how the probability of market adoption changes
with employer size. In Column 1, employers with 10 or more internal workers are 7 percentage points (25
percent) less likely to adopt compared to sole proprietors and individuals (the excluded category). It is not
the existence of internal workers that drives the negative result, as employers with between 2 and 9 workers
have similar estimates to individuals. The estimates in Column 2 change little with geography fixed effects.
This negative pattern between market and adoption and firm size appears to be driven by a lower value
for the market, as captured from our estimate of µˆi. Columns 3 and 4 change the dependent variable to
µˆi and show that it is the baseline value for the market (estimated from exogenous wage variation) that is
lower for larger employers. Relative to employers with no internal employees, the average µˆ is over 28 log
points lower for employers with 10 or more internal workers.
The negative relationship between an employer’s value for the market and firm size may be due to
several underlying reasons. Large employers may have difficulty integrating online hiring into their existing
24This calculation is µˆi = Σ
3
k=1µk
ρkΠioΣjpiχoj(µk)
y=j
ΣK
k=1
ρkΠioΣjpiχoj(µk)
y=j .
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processes. There is substantial literature showing there is a firm size wage premium (Oi and Idson, 1999),
which may put pressure on large firms to save wages. Our results suggest that jobs at large firms are
less likely to be outsourced online even in the face of mounting domestic outsourcing (Goldschmidt and
Schmieder, 2017; Bloom, Guvenen, Smith, Song, and von Wachter, 2018). This suggests that the overhead
costs of specifying and hiring for individual tasks is less likely to be worthwhile when tasks are frequent
and somewhat standardized. Alternatively, large employers may have easily accessible sources of internal
labor resources that are unavailable to smaller employers or single individuals.
4.2 Wage Elasticities and Interpreting Workers’ Bids
This section presents a framework for interpreting how hiring elasticities influence applicant bidding behav-
ior. Elasticities are reported in Table 4, Panel C. Inexperienced employers are less elastic than experienced
employers, indicating a greater sensitivity of the hiring probability with respect to wage bids.
Our starting point is to model worker bidding using tools for analyzing competition between hetero-
geneous producers that have some local market power. This assumption is reasonable because the data
suggest workers appear differentiated to employers. For example, hiring the worker who submits the low-
est hourly bid is relatively rare for employers.25 As a result, we view workers as akin to “differentiated
products,” and the demand estimates allow us to characterize how employers trade off wage bids and other
characteristics. Implicit is that workers with different attributes compete to be hired through their hourly
wage bid choices. Several resulting implications result for the supply side of this labor market. Recall that
the summary statistics provided in Tables 1 and 2 show that wage bids decline with employer experience.
We examine the extent to which lower bids are due to differing hiring elasticities.
4.2.1 The worker’s problem
We interpret observed wage bids as optimal functions of workers’ costs and the demand elasticity for each
worker in a Betrand-Nash oligopoly. We then use the estimated elasticities together with data on wage bids
to back out the implied markups included in the bids over workers’ costs. Worker j’s cost, ciχj , captures
her outside option and her expected costs of applying to and/or being hired for the job posted by employer
i with experience level χ. When choosing the wage bid, the worker’s objective function takes this cost
into account along with the hiring probability.26 Her wage bid also takes into account the ad-valorem fees
25In the Appendix, Figure 9 shows the distribution of the wage bid decile, calculated within each job opening, of the worker
who was ultimately hired.
26In our setting, the wage bid is the worker’s only strategic variable. We assume the fit between the employer/job and the
worker is unknown at the time of application. This partially differs from the broader model of quality and price choice in
monopolistic competition with experience goods in Riordan (1986).
23
retained by the platform, τ . The worker chooses the wage bid, wiχoj , that maximizes
piχoj︸︷︷︸
Pr(hired)
× exp (logwiχoj − log(1 + τ))︸ ︷︷ ︸
Post−fee wage
+ (1− piχoj)× ciχj︸︷︷︸
Cost
, (6)
where logwiχoj is the log of the wage bid inclusive of τ . If she is hired, the worker receives the wage
wiχoj
(1+τ) = exp (logwiχoj − log(1 + τ)) and the employer pays wiχoj . If worker j is not hired, she receives ciχj ,
her “net” outside option, which includes the opportunity cost of her alternative use of time, along with the
expected direct costs of interviewing or working on the job.27 The worker’s first order condition is given
by
∂piχoj
∂ logwiχoj
(
wiχj
(1 + τ)
− ciχj
)
+ piχoj
wiχoj
(1 + τ)
= 0. (7)
The system of equations containing the first order condition for each applicant determines Bertrand-Nash
equilibrium bids. Solving for worker j’s optimal wage bid gives
w∗iχoj = ciχj (1 + τ)
(
1 + piχoj/
∂piχoj
∂ logwiχoj
)−1
. (8)
The bid is related to three objects: ciχj (1 + τ), workers’ costs and the ad-valorem platform fee; piχoj ,
the employer’s hiring probability as a function of the bid; and
∂piχoj
∂ logwiχoj
, the semi-elasticity of the hiring
probability with respect to the wage bid. The term
(
1 + piχoj/
∂piχoj
∂ logwiχoj
)−1
is the markup over the worker’s
job-specific costs. The bid equation can be rearranged to give workers’ costs,
ciχj =
wiχoj
(1 + τ)
(
1 + piχoj/
∂piχoj
∂ logwiχoj
)
, (9)
illustrating how having an estimate of piχoj and
∂piχoj
∂ logwiχoj
, together with the bids and platform fees observed
in the data, yields worker-job specific estimates of costs and markups.28
27The objective could alternatively be written: maxlogwiχoj piχoj × exp (logwiχoj − log(1 + τ)− ciχjH)+ [1− piχoj ]× ciχjO,
where ciχjH is a cost from on-the-job work associated with being hired for job i, and ciχjO is the outside wage for worker j.
The first order condition in this case makes clear that only ciχj = ciχjH + ciχjO can be identified.
28 This optimal bid equation offers more insight as to how the exchange rate instrument described in Section 3 affects workers’
bids. Assume that ciχj is denominated in the local currency, whereas the bids observed by employers are denominated in
dollars. Costs in the local currency must be translated into dollars when submitting bids, so the worker’s optimal bid becomes
w∗iχoj = ciχj
(
D
L
)θ
(1 + τ)
(
1 + piχoj/
dpiχoj
d logwiχoj
)
−1
. The dollar-to-local-currency exchange rate is D
L
, and the parameter θ
captures possible reasons for deviations from complete pass through. These reasons include include the following: (i) Some
part of a worker’s opportunity cost reflects transactions denominated in dollars rather than in the local currency, which may
occur if the possibility of receiving an alternative wage comes from searching online; (ii) part of a worker’s consumption may
become cheaper through imports; and (iii) the incidence of exchange rate variation is split between workers and employers. The
worker’s optimal log bid can be written as a mapping from local-currency-denominated opportunity costs to dollar-denominated
bids, as
log (wiχoj) = θ log
(
D
L
)
+ log (ciχj) + log (1 + τ)− log
(
1 + piχj/
∂piχoj
∂ logwiχoj
)
, (10)
which forms the first stage regression for the hiring probability estimation.
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4.2.2 Elasticity estimates
We find the wage bid decline with employer experience can primarily be attributed to differences in
demand—that is, differences in the optimal bid and markup arising from elasticities. The coefficient
on the log hourly bid, αχ, differs by employer experience, as shown in Panel C of Table 4. The odd-
numbered columns show estimates of αχ=I for employers who have never hired before on the site. The
even-numbered columns present additive deviations for experienced employers relative to the baseline esti-
mate for inexperienced employers. That is, the experienced employer columns contain parameter estimates
on interactions with experience. A comparison across each pair of columns shows αχ is significantly larger
in magnitude (more negative) for experienced employers, and these employers have significantly larger
hiring wage elasticities.29
Columns 1 and 2 include the estimates after including the control function from the first stage estimates
but without allowing for employer heterogeneity in type. We comment first on estimates of elasticities with
respect to individual worker bids. Inexperienced employers have an estimated wage elasticity of −5.46,
whereas experienced employers are more wage elastic, with an estimated elasticity of −8.54. Columns 3
and 4 exclude worker resume characteristics from the first stage (corresponding to Columns 3 and 4 of
Table 3), and Columns 5 and 6 include these characteristics (as per Columns 1 and 2 of Table 3). In
the specifications in Columns 5 and 6, the mean own-bid elasticity for inexperienced employers is −4.96.
The experienced employer segment is more elastic, with an estimated own-bid elasticity that is larger in
absolute magnitude by 2.74, at −7.70.
These estimated elasticities imply differences in markups over workers’ opportunity costs. The esti-
mated average markup over cost included in inexperienced employers’ bids is 25.2%, compared to 14.9%
for experienced employers. Referring again to Columns 5 and 6 in Table 4, the mean cost of working for an
inexperienced employer is 7.43 USD per hour (before the oDesk fee), compared to 7.35 USD per hour in the
experienced sample. Thus, the estimates show only a small additional expected cost when applying to an
inexperienced employer. The results suggest both demand- and supply-side effects play a role in the new
employer bid premium, although of differing relative importance. In the preferred estimates in Columns
5 and 6, around 88% of the observed wage-bid premium to inexperienced employers can be attributed
to the higher markups set by workers who anticipate that new employers have relatively inelastic hiring
probabilities. Only 12% is due to the higher expected costs when applying to new employers.
If costs of applying to an inexperienced employer are similar but markups are higher, why doesn’t entry
of additional applicants drive down markups? We contend application order affects whether employers
consider an applicant, with late arrivals much less likely to be hired. Included in the Xoj matrix is a
29The semi-elasticity in the conditional logit model is (1− piχj)αχ. In the specifications that allow for heterogeneity across
employers, the mean semi-elasticity is Σkρ
S
k (1− piχj(µk))αχ.
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flexible spline for the applicant’s position in the order of candidates who arrive, with knots that correspond
to the pagination order that would require an employer to click on a new page. The elasticity estimates
control for arrival position of an applicant, which is known to an applicant when making a bid. The
parameter estimates show that later applicants, after the first 30, are much less likely to be hired. This
finding is consistent with the relationship in Figure 7, which shows employers do not tend to consider late-
arriving applicants, as measured by interviews or hires. Employers’ probability of choosing later applicants
falls faster than the prospective benefits of competition from more applicants, allowing positive markups.
Figure 7: Probability of Being Interviewed or Hired, by Applicant Order
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This figure plots the probability an employer either interviews or hires a worker as a function of the order in which she applies.
Earlier applicants are much more likely to land interviews or jobs.
The final row of Table 4 presents estimates of the elasticity of vacancy fill with respect to a change in
wage bids for all job applicants. These estimates are calculations of the elasticity that the employer hires any
worker for this job posting with respect to a percentage increase in wage bids from all workers. Comparing
Columns 1 and 5 demonstrates the role of employer heterogeneity in estimating the elasticity of the hiring
decision for inexperienced employers. Controlling for the increased variance of employer type among the
inexperienced reveals new employers’ vacancy fill rate is relatively inelastic, at 2.93. Importantly, comparing
the odd- and even-numbered columns in the table, experienced employers are found to be more elastic than
the inexperienced on the extensive margin of hiring any worker across all specifications. The difference
in vacancy-fill wage elasticity is greatest in Columns 5 and 6, which is the specification that controls for
both varying employer heterogeneity with experience and the full set of worker resume characteristics.
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This relative inelasticity of new employer hiring will become relevant later when discussing counterfactuals
related to changes in platform fees.
4.2.3 Search effort and wage elasticity differences
Why are experienced employers’ hiring probabilities relatively wage elastic? We consider explanations
based on experienced employers’ ability to recall prior job applicants. We note that experienced employers
interview fewer applicants before hiring, reducing their search effort. We then show experienced employers
have a stock of prior applicants to whom they can turn rather than evaluating new applicants. This stock
provides latent competition for a job and is a potential reason for the decline in observed search effort
with experience. A related possible explanation behind the changing elasticity of hiring is that declining
interviews suggest employers have a different perception of how to evaluate workers because of differences in
the precision of signals received from job applicants.30 Some models, as discussed in (Englmaier, Schmo¨ller,
and Stowasser, 2017), focus on inattention or limited information processing. In our context, the weights
on resume characteristics are allowed to change, capturing some information processing differences.
Consistent with an Experience Market, if employers are using interviews to learn about their own value
for the market as a whole, the marginal benefit of an interview is higher when employers know relatively
little about their value for the market. It is therefore optimal for inexperienced employers to interview
more applicants. Appendix Table A3 presents the results of a regression of (1+ the log of) the number of
interviews conducted for each job on the number of previous hires made, along with various controls. In
all specifications with employer fixed effects, the number of interviews decreases, and at a decreasing rate,
as the cumulative number of prior hires increases. The predicted number of interviews falls by 67% after
five prior hires, and a large share of that decline happens between the first and second jobs.
At first glance, these results might suggest that experienced employers are sampling or considering fewer
applicants, which would arguably make them less elastic when considering a worker. However, a different
interpretation is that employers simultaneously interview fewer applicants and become more elastic with
experience because they have built up a stock of prior applicants who might be latent competitors for the
job. An experienced employer is likely to know the productive value of previously hired workers, while also
having a relatively precise signal about each previously interviewed worker. If new applicants to later jobs
understand they are competing not only with all other new applicants, but also with the workers that are
already known to the employer, they will act as if they are part of a more competitive applicant pool. Our
30However, attributing differences in the elasticity to employer learning would require a relatively complicated setup com-
pared to the seminal papers on learning and information acquisition in labor economics. Standard learning models feature
normal signals and normal noise (Lange, 2007; Kahn, 2013; Kahn and Lange, 2014). If employers are learning about the
market as a whole, any noise in the difference between workers (which is relevant for pinning down workers’ market power)
can be filtered by the employer. We thank Fabian Lange for pointing this out.
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sampling approach shuts down repeat hiring, but the sequential sample does include hires of applicants
who were interviewed for a previous job opening.
We look for direct evidence that employers retain access to the workers that they interacted with on
prior job postings. The data show that in the 38, 342 cases in which a previously interviewed applicant is
an applicant for a subsequent job posting, 49% of these applications were initiated by the employer. This
finding contrasts with the 8% of applications that were employer-initiated among applicants that were not
previously interviewed. Experienced employers thus appear to ”know where to look” and do return to
access their stock of previously interviewed candidates. Of the 19, 670 experienced employer hires, 1, 408
of the hires are workers who were interviewed for a previous job posting. Access to this latent supply of
workers serves as a further benefit to being experienced in the market—subsequent jobs are perceived by
new applicants as being more competitive.
4.3 Worker Sorting and the Instrument
We now assess the sensitivity of the identifying assumptions behind the demand results. We explore
possible worker sorting on the instrument as it relates to differences in the estimates for inexperienced
and experienced employers. To check whether worker sorting concerns or omitted variables are driving the
results, we compare the estimates in Columns 3 and 4 of Table 4, the estimates without worker resume
characteristics, with the estimates given in Columns 5 and 6 that include these characteristics. Both
specifications suggest a similar shift in employers’ log productive value for the platform with experience,
but the relative importance of learning-by-hiring versus employer composition is reversed. This finding is
intuitive because the matrix Xoj includes worker characteristics in Columns 5 and 6; with the additional
characteristics, changes in βχ have more weight, reducing the weight placed on changes in the distribution
of µi between employer groups.
Also relevant to our understanding of employer demand is the impact of the omission of workers’ re-
sume characteristics for the elasticity estimates produced. Including worker characteristics in the model,
the estimated markups for the inexperienced and experienced are 25.2% and 14.9%, respectively. Omitting
these characteristics results in a smaller estimated markup difference between inexperienced and experi-
enced employers. This comparison suggests that had we been able to include worker characteristics that
are unobserved to us, the estimated markup differences would have been even larger than those in Columns
5 and 6. Unfortunately, we cannot estimate a model that includes worker fixed effects in the first stage,
due to the incidental parameters problem.31 If sorting into applying based on worker fixed effects goes
in the same direction as the sorting based on observable worker characteristics, for which we can control,
31As discussed previously, many of the workers observed in the sample make only a single bid. Small numbers of bids mean
sampling error in the estimates of the worker effects make them inconsistent. Including these inconsistently estimated effects
in a non-linear transformation would bias the estimates of other parameters.
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our estimate of the difference in markups to inexperienced and experienced employers may be downward
biased.
5 Analysis of Supply-Based Explanations Using Variation in Workers’
Bids
The analysis so far attributes almost all the changes in outcomes between inexperienced and experienced
employers to demand-side explanations. Our data permit further investigation of alternative supply side
explanations, using, primarily, information about wage bids. We assume worker-level wage bids reflect
workers’ costs and benefits from applying for a job, and our approach asks whether workers are willing to
submit different bids because employer experience itself is correlated with attributes that change workers’
expected costs. These attributes might include relationship duration, the propensity of employers to
leave good feedback, or the risk due to lack of employer reputation. Several other potential explanations
are unobservable in the data. For example, how an employer writes a job description may change with
experience in a way that affects workers’ anticipated costs of applying. To address the role of unobservables,
we validate our estimates with evidence from a small-scale field experiment in which we varied observable
employer experience in job postings.
5.1 Wage Bids Decline with Employer Experience
Table 6 motivates the supply-side analysis by presenting regressions of the log of applicants’ hourly wage
bids as a function of employer experience. Consistent with Tables 1 and 2, experienced employers receive
lower bids. The coefficients capture the percentage difference between the hourly wage bids received by
inexperienced employers and the bids received by employers after hiring one, two, three, four, or five-plus
workers. The first column includes fixed effects for job categories and calendar time. Employers receive
bids that are approximately 3% lower after making one hire. Bids continue to fall after subsequent hires,
and employers who have made five or more previous hires receive bids that are 7.6% lower than those
received by employers who have not previously hired. Column 2 adds controls for detailed worker resume
characteristics, controls for who initiated the application, and a third-order polynomial in the number of
characters included in the job description. The observed decline in average wage bids received by employers
with five or more prior hires is 5.9%. The monotone decline in bids in both specifications is consistent with
more experienced employers having sampled a larger stock of prior workers who may be latent competitors
for the job.
The subsequent columns of Table 6 show these results remain within employer and within worker.
Exercises with employer fixed effects further indicate whether sorting or unobserved heterogeneity (to the
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econometrician, but not to workers) drives workers’ bidding decisions. In Columns 3 and 4 with employer
fixed effects, bids are 4.7% lower when an employer has five or more prior hires than when he has no
experience. This decline suggests within-employer change, rather than permanent differences in what
workers observe about job postings, drives the declining bids. The bid reduction remains when adding
worker and job characteristics. Columns 5 and 6 remove employer fixed effects and add worker fixed
effects. For a given worker, bids to employers who have previously made five or more hires are, on average,
3.9% lower than bids to employers with no observable experience. We now evaluate and rule out several
plausible supply-side reasons for the observed within-worker and within-employer decline in wage bids with
employer experience.
5.2 Job Characteristics, Employer Attributes, and Variation in Wage Bids
We first consider the possibility that workers view a job application to an experienced employer as having
better long-term prospects than an application to an inexperienced employer. For this effect to explain
higher bids to inexperienced employers, workers must be willing to take a short-term wage reduction to
secure this relationship. Table 7, which presents data on the empirical distribution of contract duration,
shows that experienced employers are not more likely to start a long-term relationship. This table displays
regressions in which the unit of analysis is the first time an employer hires a worker, whereas the outcomes
are calculated over the entire duration of the future employer-worker match, including any subsequent
contracts. The first two columns regress the log number of hours worked over the first and all future
contracts on indicators for employer experience the first time an employer-worker match occurs. Odd-
numbered columns are simple OLS regressions, and even-numbered columns include fixed effects for the
employers’ stated duration of a job. In each of the first two columns, the coefficients on employer experience
tend to decline, meaning jobs started with inexperienced employers do not result in shorter relationships
than those started with more experienced employers.32 We also find no evidence for ex-post differences in
bargaining power, performance-based pay, or renegotiation after a job starts. Columns 3 and 4 evaluate
whether applicants prefer working for experienced employers because they are more likely to provide raises
after the contract begins, and the findings show no differences by employer experience.
Alternatively, an applicant might expect the feedback she receives to differ by employer experience.
Receiving good feedback is helpful to workers’ careers, and could therefore motivate worker bid differences.33
32Inexperienced employers state in job posts that their jobs are likely to be of shorter duration, which is not surprising if
small trial jobs are used to resolve uncertainty. Column 2 conditions on the expected duration of the job as stated in the job
post. Within expected-duration categories, the results are stronger.
33For example, in an experiment on the provision of worker-level information, Pallais (2014) shows the revelation of public
feedback about workers is beneficial to their later careers on this platform. Stanton and Thomas (2016) show the effect of
worker feedback is concentrated among workers for whom employers have the least information. Similar issues may be at play
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Columns 5 and 6 of Table 7 reveal a positive correlation between such feedback and employer experience.
However, the magnitude of these differences is small. The feedback score given by employers with up to
four previous hires is, on average, less than one-half of 1% higher than the score given by employers with no
previous hires.34 The increase in the feedback score is 1.5% for employers with five or more previous hires
compared to those with none. Unlike wages, patterns of feedback differences do not display a monotonic
relationship with employer experience, suggesting that this factor is unlikely to explain the monotone
decline in wage bids with employer experience shown in Table 6.
Table 8, Panel A, assesses whether feedback risk may drive these results by allowing heterogeneity in
bids based on the feedback an employer left for prior workers. Although it would have required some effort
from applicants at different times over the platform’s evolution, they could have navigated to the history
of feedback that employers left for workers on prior jobs. We show that employers who left low feedback
(possibly because of miscalibration with the distribution or because of a bad initial match) did not receive
higher subsequent wage bids. In fact, employers who left good feedback for workers received higher wage
offers later, inconsistent with poor feedback risk driving the wage-bid results.
Third, we show that bids actually increase with the interaction of employer experience and the feedback
an employers has received from past workers. After observing good bilateral feedback about an employer,
future applicants actually make higher bids to experienced employers with good feedback than to experi-
enced employers with poor feedback. Experienced employers who have not received feedback also receive
higher bids than employers who have poor past feedback. Table 8, Panel B, in which the log bid is the
dependent variable, presents two sets of results on how bids vary with employer experience and employer
feedback. First, controlling for the feedback received from past workers, wage bids decline robustly with
employer experience. Only employers with hiring experience can have a feedback score, but many expe-
rienced employers have no feedback from past hires. Indicators for the employer having no observable
feedback and for the employer having observable feedback of 4.5 or higher are interacted with an indicator
for having observable prior hiring experience. Thus, the baseline group in the regression is experienced
employers who have feedback scores lower than 4.5. The interaction terms capture deviations from the
baseline for experienced employers with good feedback and for those with no feedback. The baseline point
estimates in Columns 2 through 6, which present the effect of experience for employers who have bad visible
feedback, show these employers receive bids that are significantly lower than those made to inexperienced
employers. The positive coefficients on good feedback and no observable feedback are inconsistent with a
risk-premium channel that would predict lower bids for employers with good feedback.
among employers; that is, feedback about how an employer treated previous hires may allow future applicants to tailor their
bids based on variation in the expected cost of working for that employer.
34For employers with one prior hire, this calculation is (0.0243/4.303) and (0.0312/4.285); similar calculations can be done
for other experience levels.
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These results offer further evidence that workers’ bids are sensitive to the likely elasticity of hiring
probability, because experienced employers with good feedback are more likely to hire, and are thus less
wage elastic than other experienced employers. Poor employer feedback appears to signal a reduced
likelihood of hiring, lowering the optimal bid to these employers. Relative to an experienced employer who
has poor feedback, the likelihood of hiring an applicant increases by 6.7 percentage points (about 13%)
for experienced employers with good feedback and by 3.7 percentage points (roughly 8%) for experienced
employers with no feedback.35 Workers appear to tailor their wage bids to the information revealed about
employers through their feedback scores, because these measures are informative about employer future
hiring decisions rather than about the costs of working for these employers.
5.3 Unobservable Employer Attributes, Wage Bids, and Interview Decisions
We next assess whether employer experience is correlated with some aspect of the job posting or hiring
process that affects workers’ application decisions. Appendix 2 shows the bid premium to inexperienced
employers does not arise due to differences in the number of observed job applicants.36 However, the
number of latent competitors through the stock of prior experience may cause applicants to anticipate
additional competition controlling for the extent of organic applications to the jobs.
Bid differences with experience also do not appear to be driven by time-varying unobservables relating
to how employers post jobs. A field experiment designed to isolate the effect of observable employer
experience from unobservable changes shows that wage bids do decline with employer experience in a
controlled setting with identical job descriptions. Appendix 2 provides more details about the experiment,
and Appendix Table A5 presents the results.
We interpret the evolution of hiring and selection as arising from information that arrives after employers
enter the platform rather than something that is known to employers ex ante. Supporting this interpre-
tation, Figure 8 asks whether the identity of the first candidate interviewed differs based on whether the
inexperienced employer subsequently conducts many or few interviews or goes onto hire. If the candidates
who are evaluated first look similar but subsequent choices differ across employers, it suggests intermediate
information is allowing employers to learn about their value for the market. The figure plots the distribu-
tion of the hourly wage bids of the worker selected for the first interview, based on an employer’s eventual
action. The split in Panel A is based on whether the employer does more or fewer than five total interviews
35These results are precisely estimated and are significant at the 1% level after clustering standard errors by employer. The
dependent variable in the regression is an indicator for hiring any applicant. The independent variables are indicators for
employer experience, the employers’ feedback, job category, expected duration, and time, along with a cubic polynomial for
the characters in the opening description.
36The premium remains when controlling for the number of job applicants in the first 24 hours after job posting, as shown
in Appendix Table A4.
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on the first job. Little difference exists in wage bids of the first interviewee for employers who go on to
interview few or many applicants. Panel B of Figure 8 plots residual bids as a function of whether the
employer hires for the first job, again showing the wage bid for early interviewees is unrelated to whether an
employer makes a hire. These results are consistent with the hypothesis that employer actions are shaped
by what they learn during the hiring process rather than by unobserved information that the employer
knows before entering the market.
Figure 8: Residual Hourly Bids by First Applicant Selected for Interview
Panel A: Log Bids for employers who conduct fewer than five and five or more interviews on the first posting.
Panel B: Log bids for employers who don't hire and who hire on the first posting.
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The figure plots the density of residual hourly wage bids of the worker selected for the first interview, based on an employer’s
eventual action. Plotted wage bids are net of job category and calendar time fixed effects. The split in Panel A is based on
whether the employer does more or fewer than five total interviews on the first job. The split in Panel B is based on whether
the employer hires.
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6 Counterfactual Analysis
In Experience Markets, where buyers learn about their own value for the market through interactions with
sellers, continued market participation depends on what buyers infer from these early interactions. Focusing
on the employers who have not previously hired, Table 1 shows 78% of the jobs posted by inexperienced
employers go unfilled. Thirty-five percent of employers hire once, and only 25% of all employers who enter
the market hire and then post jobs as experienced employers. These statistics suggest a large share of
employers receive signals that lead them to negatively update their beliefs about their own value for using
the market. At the same time, inexperienced employers receive higher wage bids than their experienced
counterparts, and these higher bids may deter the potential realization of future value that accrues with
experience. In this section, we explore how the platform could encourage initial hiring by altering the
platform fee schedule to depend on the employers’ experience with hiring. We assess how platform profits
change for a variety of different fees to inexperienced and experienced employers.
From its founding through the end of the sample period, the oDesk fee was constant, at 10% of wages.37
We implement counterfactual analysis of different fees using a model-based assessment of how changes in
these fees would affect the number of employers who become experienced and their propensity to hire
initially and thereafter. We take the estimates of demand by employer experience as a sufficient statistic
for how employers hire, and then we adjust the parameters based on various different assumptions about
what employers anticipate in the future.
An important aspect of this exercise is based on the premise that information is revealed with experience.
Although our estimates do not model information acquisition, we take the type heterogeneity among
inexperienced employers as an approximation of the distribution of signals that arrive to these employers.
We model how inexperienced hiring and selection into becoming experienced changes with different pairs
of fees charged to the inexperienced and experienced. To do so, we calculate a baseline transition rate
conditional on hiring into becoming an experienced employer using the posterior distribution of types in the
data. We then adjust these transition probabilities based on how surplus from using the market changes
as a function of (i) the fees imposed and (ii) workers’ endogenous markups in response to these fees and
the changing composition of employers.
To provide intuition about the tradeoff faced by the platform, Appendix 3 presents a simple version of
the platform’s problem for the case of specific (fixed) fees. The insight from the fixed-fee case is simple
and translates to thinking about ad-valorem fees (but with substantial additional algebra): A fee has
revenue implications for the platform but also governs selection into becoming experienced. Optimal fees
for inexperienced employers balance revenue today with the reduced probability of hiring and, hence, future
37After the sample period ended, the platform raised baseline fees and implemented quantity discounts, but we do not have
data from this period.
34
expected revenue after transitioning into the experienced segment.
This description characterizes the platform’s tradeoff when employers have no foresight about the distri-
bution of future wage bids. We also consider a different scenario where we assume that employers perfectly
anticipate future equilibrium wage bids when they become experienced. When employers anticipate future
wage bids, our solution requires iterating until convergence over: (i) hiring decisions among inexperienced
employers that depend on the future discounted value of using the platform as a function of changes in
experienced employer wage bids, (ii) inexperienced employers’ decisions to post jobs after initial hiring,
adjusting for any change in expected future surplus due to the fee change on experienced employers, and
(iii) the wage-bid markups that result from the elasticity of demand and fees among experienced employers
who post additional jobs. Additional computational details are provided in Appendix 3.
After implementing these steps, we also must determine a long-run value of experienced employers to
the platform.38 This value is akin to a discount rate for the platform in order to compute the present value
of future hires. We choose a present value of four future jobs per experienced employer, which is a larger
number than the average number of future jobs for those employers who gain experience; choosing this
larger number, however, biases us towards concluding the platform should induce new employers to gain
experience.
Despite an optimistic view of the long-run value of an experienced employer, we find the optimal fee
on new employers is higher than the existing fee of 10%, whereas the optimal fee on experienced employers
depends on the assumption made about how inexperienced employers anticipate future wages. Table 9
presents the results under each of two assumptions. Panels A and B present percentage changes in profits
relative to the current fee structure for each case, whereas Panel C provides percentage changes in the
number of employers transitioning to the experienced segment when employers do not anticipate future
wages.
The main result is that the profit-maximizing fee for inexperienced employers is always at least as high
as the profit-maximizing fee for experienced employers. Profit-maximizing fees for both experience levels
are weakly higher than the 10% fees in place at the time of the sample. When employers anticipate future
bids, however, the platform shades down fees on experienced employers relative to the case in Panel B
where future wage bids do not have an effect on the hiring decision. Panel C shows that under the profit-
maximizing fee for myopic employers, a dramatic decline occurs in the number of experienced employers
on the platform, with the share of new employers who become experienced falling by about 38%. When
inexperienced employers anticipate future wage bid changes (unreported), the share of employers who
transition to become experienced falls by over 30%. Platform profits are maximized when a lower share of
38Finding this value requires potential extrapolation because future hiring behavior for many employers is only observed
over a potentially short horizon.
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employers than that under the current fee structure is induced to gain experience. Platform size would be
reduced, but per-transaction profitability would more than offset the reduction in transaction volumes.39
7 Conclusion
Much of the recent interest in alternative employment arrangements has focused on the domestic labor
market (Katz and Krueger, 2019), but the underlying technology behind gig economy platforms also
enables remote contracting with distant workers. The potential wage savings from outsourcing service
tasks domestically or abroad are enormous (Clemens, 2011), but relatively little is known about employers’
adoption of new technologies to access this hiring channel. This paper sheds light on barriers to employers’
use of online outsourcing for service tasks by characterizing how labor demand and workers’ supply change
as a function of an employer’s experience with online hiring. To do so, we use data from a large online labor
market and estimate employers’ propensity to hire individual workers as a function of worker characteristics,
job characteristics, and wages. We allow the model to vary with an employer’s experience with hiring,
while incorporating unobserved employer heterogeneity and non-random selection into gaining experience.
We account for the endogeneity of wages using an instrumental variables strategy and Petrin and Train’s
(2010) control function estimator.
The majority of new employers who try out online hiring through this platform never end up using
it to fill a vacancy. Employers who have gained experience, however, are more than twice likely to fill a
vacancy than inexperienced employers. There are two main factors that contribute to this difference, and
both relate to employer demand. First, hiring experience shifts out employers’ value for remote workers,
reflecting gains from learning-by-doing. Although we do not observe the source of learning-by-doing, we
document that experienced employers expend less search effort during the online hiring process. They are
likely to have gained familiarity with tailoring their communications and coordination of work with remote
employees.
Second, the rising vacancy fill rate with employer experience is also due to exit from the market of
employers with low valuations for online work, despite the anticipated benefits of learning-by-doing. Given
that these low value employers created accounts and posted jobs online, we infer that employers need to try
out the platform to determine their value for online hiring. The presence of buyers who don’t know their
own value for the market relative to their outside option is likely to be a characteristic of all unfamiliar
39One limitation of this analysis is that it does not account for other platforms’ competitive response or entry of competing
marketplaces. These considerations may reduce profit-maximizing fees. In addition, the analysis abstracts away from tailored
offers that deviate from this fee structure. Here, wage offers to employers are assumed to be based on only observed historical
use of the platform, but additional segmentation or non-linear schemes may allow the platform to price discriminate on other
observable employer attributes.
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markets for procuring goods or services, similar to the concept of experience goods in Nelson (1970). An
important implication is that accurate measurement of new buyers’ price elasticity requires researchers to
account for the larger heterogeneity in market value among these buyers compared to the selected group
of buyers who have purchased in the market before. The extent of heterogeneous employer value for online
hiring is substantial. The average change in employers’ value for online hiring due to the exit of low value
types is equivalent to about a 9% reduction in workers’ wages.
The employer characteristic that correlates most strongly with our estimates for the value of online
hiring is firm size. Large employers have relatively low average valuations for using the market. We note
that these valuations are all relative to the individual employer’s alternative hiring options. One possible
explanation for the negative association between platform value and employer size is that the ease with
which remote hiring can be coordinated with other production activities decreases with the size of the firm.
This inference is consistent with (Fort, 2017), which shows that technology enables more fragmentation
and outsourcing in industries whose production specifications are easy to codify. Alternative explanations
also relate to the employer’s production process, as a large firm may find it more cumbersome to manage
the internal bureaucracy of contracting at arm’s length.
On the applicant side of the market, workers’ supply to new employers does not prevent employers
from adopting the market. In contrast to the importance of positive feedback for workers in improving
their future outcomes on the platform (Pallais, 2014; Stanton and Thomas, 2016), good feedback for
experienced employers actually results in worker’s marking up their wage bids. Workers appear to account
for the positive correlation between feedback and the probability of filling a vacancy when bidding for jobs.
The ability to hire globally has not led to the forecast death of distance in the distribution of work,
despite the large potential wage savings from online hiring. Our results suggest the challenge of outsourcing
at the task-level is what creates most of the distance cost, rather than the geographic distance between
employers and workers. We use the estimates to consider how the size and profitability of the platform
would change after encouraging new employer entry through subsidies. Subsidizing new employers would
not be profitable for the platform. Instead, pursuing a niche strategy, targeting the small share of employers
who are able to coordinate outsourced task-level online work with their other production activities is most
profitable for platform operators.
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Appendix
Appendix 1: Data Details and Cleaning
Data cleaning details
Appendix Table 1 gives details about the resume data used in the full sample and in the sample used for
hiring probability estimation. The following restrictions are used to clean job openings for the purposes of
estimating hiring probabilities. First, to be able to characterize the set of applicants for individual jobs,
the sample is restricted to openings that have at least one day of elapsed time between the current job
posting and the next job posting and at least one day of elapsed time between the previous posting and the
current posting. This restriction allows for a full application cycle of workers from different time zones and
eliminates batched hiring for which applicants may blend across jobs. The sample for estimating hiring
probabilities also drops jobs for which the employer hires a previously hired worker, because whether these
jobs are new or the continuation of a pre-existing contract under different terms is unclear.
Many jobs also appear to originate from bringing an oﬄine relationship onto the platform. Filtering
these jobs requires that at least one application be worker-initiated, and the total number of candidates
must be greater than five. The restriction to five total applicants eliminates most obvious cases in which
an employer posts a job as publicly visible but with the intention of hiring a pre-selected candidate or set
of candidates. We omit any job from an employer who sends over 100 interview requests for the first job
or who sends over 60 interview requests for a subsequent posting. These postings are likely to be fake jobs
posted by spammers. Finally, we drop any job that is later declared to have been posted by mistake. The
following restrictions are used to clean applications: First, we drop applications from invited workers who
later report they are unavailable; second, we drop applications if the employer reports obvious spam.
Appendix 2: Alternative Explanations for Declining Wage Bids
Bids of hired workers relative to other applicants
The solid bars of the histogram in Figure 9 present the bid decile among all applicants of the worker who
was hired when applying to jobs posted by employers with no prior hiring experience. Around 13% of all
employers hire a worker whose bid is in the top decile of the distribution of bids for the job. Less than 20%
of inexperienced employers who hire choose a worker whose bid is in the lowest decile of the job-specific
bid distribution. Experienced employers, shown in the histogram with the outlined bars, are somewhat
more likely to hire workers in the lowest wage bid decile.
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Figure 9: Bid Decile of Hired Worker
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The figure shows the bid decile of the worker who is hired from the set of applicants. For each job opening, we find the decile
of wage bid for each applicant. We then take the decile of the applicant who was hired and plot the histogram of wage bid
deciles for applicants selected by inexperienced employers (solid bars) and by experienced employers (outlined bars).
Different Application Rates
The extent of competition for a job posting might change with employer experience, and workers might
submit lower wage bids when they anticipate a more competitive market. For variation in anticipated
market competitiveness to explain the bid premium to inexperienced employers, workers must anticipate
that the job postings by experienced employers are more competitive. Table 1 (Columns 2 and 7) shows
that inexperienced employers in the sequential sample receive a smaller number of applicants in total,
suggesting that, on average, competition might indeed be greater for employers’ later jobs.
To examine this possibility, Table A4 repeats the analysis from Table 6, but the estimations include
the log arrival rate of applicants within the first 24 hours of posting the job as an additional control. Note
the regressions already include a spline in the application number, and bidders can observe the number
of prior applicants when making their bid. This additional regressor removes the effect of expected future
competition on bids. The faster the rate, the lower all bids received by the employer. However, including
this control does not change the main finding from Table 6 that experienced employers receive significantly
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lower bids.
Results from Experimental Job Postings
To guard against time-varying unobservables at the job opening level that might change workers’ bids,
we ran a small field experiment to isolate the effect of employer experience alone.40 We posted identical
jobs from the accounts of employers with different levels of experience. Employer 1 had no experience,
whereas employer 2 had prior hiring experience and a good feedback score. Each employer posted a short,
identically worded job description in the “Data Entry” job sub-category. The task description read ”I need
you to take data from a website and put it into excel.” No additional detail was provided.
Two dependent variables are of interest in regressions using the experimental data to estimate the
causal effect of experience on bids. The first is the actual log bid submitted to the job. The second is the
difference in the log bid and the log hourly rate posted in the worker’s profile. This latter measure helps
to pick up unobserved heterogeneity about workers who may sort to jobs. These measures are regressed on
an indicator that the job was posted by the experienced employer. Some specifications also control for the
number of hours the applicant has previously worked on the platform or application order fixed effects.
Table A5 contains the results. In each specification, we see a significant, negative point estimate on
the experienced employer indicator variable. The effect sizes are larger in magnitude than those estimated
in Table 6. In addition, pairwise comparisons of Columns 1-3 and Columns 4-6 indicate very similar point
estimates when the dependent variable is the log of the actual bid as opposed to the log of the difference in
the actual bid from the rate posted in the applicant’s profile. This exercises isolates the effect of observable
experience in driving lower bids.
Wage Bargaining
Our wage bid data contain the final offer to an employer. When an applicant is not hired, the final and
first offers coincide: when she is, the first and final offers may differ. Applicants’ first bids might vary with
employer experience, because they expect employers to have become more or less skilled negotiators.
Early on in our previous project (Stanton and Thomas, 2016), we investigated the extent to which
offers changed between first and final offers; unfortunately, those queries were not pulled down from the
company’s servers. Those early queries found, however, very limited bargaining from initial offer to final
wage for either employer segment. To construct an analysis of the extent to which bargaining may affect
our results, we use the insight that rejected applications will have the same initial and final wage offer.
Rejected wage offers for employers with similar experience are highly serially correlated. To construct
40Unfortunately, we are unable to conduct this experiment on a larger scale, because of the Upwork terms of use relating to
creating employer accounts.
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an initial offer for workers who are hired, we take the last rejected wage offer to employers of the same
experience level in the same job category. We then compare the observed wage on hires made to the last
wage offer received on rejected applications.
Using these measures to assess the extent of bargaining is imperfect, because they likely overstate the
extent to which bargaining occurs, because (i) wages tend to decline over time if an applicant hasn’t landed
a job and continues to apply, and (ii) the parties may set up side payments off the platform to avoid the
platform fee, especially if they have prior experience working together. With declining wages over time,
accepted wages on hires that are below the last rejected wage bid will inflate the extent to which employers
bargain over wages. However, under the assumption that this measurement problem does not differ by
employer experience, regressions of the difference in the final log wage when hired and the last log wage
bid on a rejected application are suggestive of whether expected differences in bargaining may change the
interpretation of the results. The second problem, of payments off-platform, is likely to be small due to
difficulties in transferring funds across banking systems. However, to the extent that they do exist, we
expect them to show up for experienced employers who have reputations.
Table A6 contains regression results analyzing bargaining. In OLS regressions, some small reductions
may exist in final wages for employers with five or more hires. The point estimate is a reduction of about
2%. These differences do not, however, reflect the immediate reduction in bids with experience seen in
other tables. Bargaining differences are not significant with the addition of employer fixed effects, meaning
this channel is unlikely to drive the pattern of results documented elsewhere.
Appendix 3: Platform Profits
Fixed Fee Differences by Employer Experience
The platform’s objective is to maximize total profits, which is equivalent to maximizing the total value
of transactions in the market, and it can do so by setting different fees for inexperienced and experienced
employers. To denote specific fees, we call the fee to inexperienced employers tI and the fee to experienced
employers tE . Let HI be an indicator for an employer hiring while inexperienced, and let HE be an
indicator for hiring while experienced. Wages for the inexperienced and experienced segment are wI and
wE , respectively.
41 The platform’s problem is
max
tI ,tE
Pr (HI |wI)× [tI + tE × Pr (HE |HI (wI) , wE)] ,
where Pr (HI |wI) is the probability that an inexperienced employer will hire given wages wI , and Pr (HE |HI (wI) , wE)
is the probability an experienced employer will hire as a function of wages wE conditional on the first hire,
41In this setup, we assume that employers have the opportunity to hire in the experienced segment only after they have
hired while inexperienced.
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HI (wI). Notice the platform does not set wages, only fees, but wages that employers face will vary with
platform fees because they are passed through.
Adding uncertainty and selection makes the fee-setting problem more interesting. When employers are
uncertain about platform valuation and some uncertainty is resolved through hiring, experienced employer
hiring probabilties, Pr (HE |HI (wI) , wE), may depend on the evolution of employers’ beliefs about the
platform as a result of hiring. That Pr (HE |HI (wI) , wE) specifically conditions on HI (wI) and the wage
paid captures the possibility that the identity of the marginal inexperienced employer may affect experi-
enced hiring. Variation in wages, induced by different platform fees, induces variation in the identity of
the marginal employer. Thus far, this formulation says nothing about how beliefs evolve with employer
experience. This leaves the learning process free, allowing for models with myopic or anticipated learning.
Using HI as shorthand for Pr (HI |wI) and HE as shorthand for Pr (HE |HI (wI) , wE) , the first order
conditions for the optimal fee levels are
HI + tI
∂HI
dwI
∂wI
∂tI
+ tEHE
∂HI
dwI
∂wI
∂tI
+ tEHI
∂HE
∂HI
∂HI
dwI
∂wI
∂tI
= 0
HE ×HI + tE
∂HE
∂wE
∂wE
∂tE
HI = 0
The solution to the system of equations sets the fee for experienced employers equal to the monetary
value of the optimal markup for a monopolist with zero marginal cost:
t∗E = −
HE
∂HE
∂wE
∂wE
∂tE
. (11)
The fee for the inexperienced is:
t∗I = −
HI
∂HI
dwI
∂wI
∂tI
− t∗EHE − t
∗
EHI
∂HE
∂HI
. (12)
The first term in t∗I is the standard static markup for the segment of inexperienced employers. However,
this markup is reduced by the latter two terms. The second term includes the future value of fees for
those hiring in the experienced segment, adjusting tI downward to account for the spillover to future
demand. The final term, which accounts for composition effects, is of particular interest. The expression
∂HE
∂HI
incorporates how the marginal employer induced to hire by the fee set for the inexperienced will
change the likelihood of future hiring.
Algorithm for Simulating Platform Fees
The following steps are used in the simulation. First, inexperienced employers are assigned draws from
the types according to the population fraction of types in the inexperienced segment.42 These types are
assigned independently from the applicant set. Then, for each ad-valorem fee pair, (τI , τE) , simulated
42These types are a weighted-average of the ”ever-experienced” and ”never-experienced” segments.
42
profits are constructed according to the following procedure: (1) Log wage bids to inexperienced employers
are calculated, where pass-through of the fee is computed according to the worker’s first order condition
for setting bids. (1a) If the inexperienced employer is forward looking and anticipates future wage bids,
the inside utility of any hire made while inexperienced changes (after looping over bids to the experienced
employers until convergence in step (3) by Pr(EverExperienced|µi)×αE∆logwE , where αE∆logwE is the
coefficient on future wages and Pr(EverExperienced|µi) is the probability that this change will become
relevant for an employer of type µi becoming experienced. (2) Inexperienced employers receive a random
uniform draw and choose whether or not to hire based on the computed choice probability. (3) For
those inexperienced employers who hire, we iterate the following steps until convergence: (a) A candidate
set of employers posts additional jobs; (b) given the openings posted, elasticities are calculated, and log
wage bids including fees and workers’ markups are determined; (c) given wage bids, the expected surplus
from posting additional jobs is computed; (d) employers’ choices to transition are updated. Employers
rationally choose to post additional jobs if the expected surplus from an opening, accounting for wage
bids and fees, exceeds the value of exiting the market. This surplus is modeled as a probabilistic function
of the expected surplus and is calibrated from the transition probability between the inexperienced and
experienced sample;43 (e) if the set of employers is stable, the loop is terminated and, if not, we return
to step (a). The loop in (3) involves re-calculating markups and log wage bids conditional on the set of
employers that transition into posting successive jobs. (4) If inexperienced employers are forward looking,
we return to step 1a and re-compute hiring decisions adjusting ∆logwE by future wage bids received by
experienced employers. Otherwise, end. (5) Profits are then based on hiring probabilities from the model
and the fee-rate associated with the chosen bid.
43The parameters are calibrated to minimize the distance between the predicted transition probability and the experienced
segment given hiring and the actual transition rate. The transition rate is allowed to depend on a constant and the expected
surplus in the experienced segment. The expected surplus is a function of the employer’s type and the expected value of hiring
a worker, computed from the well-known surplus formula for the conditional logit.
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Table 1: Job Openings and Hiring Probabilities by Employer Hiring Experience
All Job Openings Sequential, Arms-Length Openings
Employers' 
Previous Hires
Number of 
Job Openings
Number of 
Candidates
Share of 
Candidates 
Initiated by 
Employer
Mean Wage 
Bid
Probability a 
Hire is Made
Number of 
Job 
Openings
Number of 
Candidates
Share of 
Candidates 
Initiated by 
Employer
Mean Wage 
Bid
Probability a 
Hire is Made
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
0 119877 18.39 7.8% 10.16 22% 61160 25.47 2.1% 10.25 16%
(25.15) (7.20) (27.25) (7.00)
1 32526 14.67 7.9% 9.77 49% 10173 27.73 2.0% 9.85 31%
(24.68) (7.03) (29.65) (6.87)
2 22269 14.11 8.1% 9.33 52% 6220 29.40 1.8% 9.35 30%
(27.83) (6.97) (36.97) (6.82)
3 16820 13.91 7.7% 9.33 54% 4525 28.28 1.8% 9.60 31%
(26.68) (7.03) (31.31) (6.89)
4+ 131378 13.74 7.4% 8.71 57% 27686 31.15 1.7% 9.06 28%
(30.37) (7.02) (39.82) (6.91)
Notes: Sample period is from January 2008 to June 2010. For details on sample composition, see Appendix 1. Numbers in parentheses are standard deviations.
Table 2: Characteristics of Applicants and Hired Workers in the Sequential, Arms-Length Sample
Job Applicants Hired Workers
Employers' Previous Hires 0 1 2 3 4+ 0 1 2 3 4+
Mean Hourly Wage Bid 10.25 9.85 9.35 9.60 9.05 10.67 10.03 9.95 9.98 9.84
(7.004) (6.868) (6.817) (6.887) (6.914) (7.376) (6.973) (6.863) (7.027) (7.199)
Good Worker Feedback 0.314 0.338 0.335 0.338 0.333 0.476 0.476 0.440 0.472 0.451
(0.464) (0.473) (0.472) (0.473) (0.471) (0.499) (0.5) (0.497) (0.499) (0.498)
No Feedback for Worker 0.473 0.427 0.437 0.428 0.443 0.304 0.327 0.337 0.301 0.343
(0.499) (0.495) (0.496) (0.495) (0.497) (0.46) (0.469) (0.473) (0.459) (0.475)
Number of Prior Jobs 5.007 5.833 5.736 5.812 5.674 9.682 9.509 9.248 9.758 8.985
(9.982) (11.619) (11.745) (11.905) (11.675) (14.83) (15.018) (16.396) (14.89) (13.976)
BA or Higher Degree 0.348 0.350 0.353 0.351 0.354 0.371 0.362 0.366 0.374 0.359
(0.476) (0.477) (0.478) (0.477) (0.478) (0.483) (0.481) (0.482) (0.484) (0.48)
Agency Affiliate 0.354 0.350 0.331 0.340 0.315 0.313 0.307 0.304 0.294 0.285
(0.478) (0.477) (0.471) (0.474) (0.465) (0.464) (0.461) (0.46) (0.456) (0.452)
Number of Observations 1,558,429 282,229 182,975 128,030 862,898 10,009 3,139 1,889 1,400 7,733
Notes: Means of applicant resume characteristics for all job applicants and workers who are hired.  The good worker feedback dummy is an indicator that the 
applicant's feedback score is greater than 4.5 out of 5 stars and is set to missing for workers who lack feedback.  Agency affiliate means the applicant is a member of a 
third-party outsourcing agency that operates on the platform, and the agency's collective reputation score is observable to employers.  Standard deviations in 
parentheses.
Table 3: First Stage Regression of Log Hourly Bids on Exchange Rate and Arrivals Instruments
Sample
Inexperienced 
Employers
Experienced 
Employers
Inexperienced 
Employers, Excluding 
Resume 
Characteristics
Experienced 
Employers, Excluding 
Resume 
Characteristics
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Log Local Currency to Dollar Exchange Rate, de-trended 0.0899*** 0.0995*** 0.0940*** 0.100***
(0.00676) (0.00832) (0.00735) (0.00913)
Residual Log Applicants per Job Opening -0.0681*** -0.0695*** -0.0805*** -0.0847***
(0.00357) (0.00383) (0.00381) (0.00409)
Number of Observations 1,558,429 1,456,132 1,558,429 1,456,132
R-Squared 0.612 0.644 0.545 0.580
F Statistic on Excluded Instruments 166.9 131.5 182.4 151.7
Notes:  First stage regression coefficients with robust standard errors in parentheses. The inexperienced sample is employers on who have never 
hired previously. The experienced sample is employers who have hired. The first instrument is the log of the average monthly local currency to US 
dollar exchange rate after removing a currency-specific linear trend. The second instrument uses the average number of applications arriving per job 
opening in the first 24 hours for other jobs in that week and job category. After taking logs, the  second instrument is purged of variation due to week 
and job category fixed effects. Regressions include indicators if an instrument is missing or, for the first instrument, is invariant within country. All 
models contain a calendar time trend, a separate trend for technical categories, job category fixed effects, a spline with four knots for applicant order 
(knots correspond to pagination after sorting by arrival time), an indicator that the application was employer-initiated, and eight country-group fixed 
effects. The last country group includes many countries with small application shares. Models in Columns 1 and 2 also include the following applicant 
characteristics: a dummy for good reported English skills, a dummy for a BA degree or higher, a dummy for having no prior work experience, a 
dummy for agency affiliation and its interaction with having no prior work experience, the number of prior jobs, and the log of the wage on the last 
hourly job. See Appendix Table 1 for details and summary statistics on the resume data. 
Table 4: Demand Model Estimates, Elasticities, Costs, and Markups 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Employer Experience Inexperienced Experienced Inexperienced Experienced Inexperienced Experienced
Resume Characteristics Yes No Yes
Control Function for Bids Yes Yes Yes
Multiple Employer Types No Yes Yes
Type-2 Intercept -2.78*** -2.65***
(0.81) (0.27)
Type-3 Intercept 1.85*** 1.82***
(0.38) (0.06)
Fraction Type 1 0.19 0.49 0.20 0.49
Fraction Type 2 0.72 0.16 0.72 0.16
Fraction Type 3 0.09 0.35 0.09 0.34
Log-bid Equivalent Change in Productive Value: 0.11 0.30 0.30
Fraction of Change Due to Worker Characteristics (X ) -14% -27% -11%
Fraction Due to Coefficients (β ) 114% 45% 79%
Fraction Due to Employer Heterogeneity (μ ) 82% 32%
Log Hourly Bid -5.50*** -3.13*** -5.08*** -0.87*** -5.10*** -2.78***
(0.42) (0.72) (0.15) (0.06) (0.26) (0.28)
Mean Own-Price Elasticity -5.46 -8.54 -5.04 -5.89 -4.96 -7.70
Mean % Markup, (Pre oDesk-Fee) 22.4% 13.3% 24.7% 20.5% 25.2% 14.9%
Mean Implied Cost (USD, Pre oDesk-Fee) $7.61 $7.46 $7.46 $7.01 $7.43 $7.35
Mean Wage Bid (USD, Pre oDesk-Fee) $9.31 $8.45 $9.31 $8.45 $9.31 $8.45
Percentage of Bid Difference Due to Markups
Elasticity of Vacancy Fill With Respect to All Bids -4.1 -5.08 -2.9 -3.28 -2.93 -4.03
Note: Experienced Employer Parameter Estimate Columns Contain Additive Interaction Terms Relative to Inexperienced Employer Baseline
Panel A: Parameter Estimates for Employer Types in Demand Models
Panel B: Valuations
Notes: Robust standard errors computed using the "sandwich form"  are in parentheses below estimated coefficients. There are 109,814 job openings in the sample used for estimation, 
with 61,196 postings by inexperienced employers and 48,168 postings by experienced employers. The type-probabilities in odd-numbered columns are for employers in the "Never 
experienced" group, and those in even-numbered columns are for employers in the "Ever experienced" group. The likelihood in Columns 1-2 is over job openings, whereas the likelihood in 
Columns 3-6 is over sequences of job openings within employer. See the text for details about the estimation procedure. In Panel B, own price elasticities are type-weighted averages of the 
individual elasticities when the model has employer heterogeneity.  The log productive value decomposition is described in the text. The elasticity of vacancy fill with respect to all bids is 
the elasticity of the employer making any hire with respect to a percentage increase in the bids of all applicants.
79% 35% 88%
Panel C: Parameter Estimates, Elasticities, and Costs 
Table 5: Market Adoption and Estimated Valuations are Declining with Firm Size
Dependent Variable: Adoption
Estimated Employer Value for 
Market
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Firm Size:
2-9 Internal Workers 0.0283** 0.0105 -0.0137 -0.0691***
(0.0109) (0.0081) (0.032) (0.0184)
10+ Internal Workers -0.0736*** -0.0676*** -0.300*** -0.279***
(0.0118) (0.0106) (0.0354) (0.0301)
Constant 0.286*** 0.294*** -1.104*** -1.079***
(0.0166) (0.00497) (0.0515) (0.0123)
Geography Fixed Effects X X
Observations 20,395 20,395 20,395 20,395
R-squared 0.006 0.043 0.007 0.054
Notes:  The unit of analysis is an employer.  The sample includes surveyed employers who report 
information about themselves or their business.  The excluded category in all regressions is sole proprietors 
or individuals.  Robust standard errors are clustered by employer geography.  The dependent variable in 
Columns 1 and 2 is an indicator that the employer posts a job after gaining hiring experience--our definition 
of market adoption.  The dependent variable in Columns 3 and 4 is the posterior estimate of the employer's 
individual value for the market, µ i , which can be interpreted on a scale relative to log wage bids.  
Table 6: Log Wage Bids Decline with Observable Employer Experience
OLS OLS
Employer Fixed 
Effects
Employer Fixed 
Effects
Worker Fixed 
Effects
Worker Fixed 
Effects
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
On posts after making 1 hire -0.0281*** -0.0197*** -0.0177*** -0.0130*** -0.0101*** -0.0113***
(0.00342) (0.00293) (0.00385) (0.00324) (0.000639) (0.000627)
2 hires -0.0407*** -0.0292*** -0.0283*** -0.0211*** -0.0170*** -0.0178***
(0.00477) (0.00416) (0.00510) (0.00436) (0.000787) (0.000773)
3 hires -0.0381*** -0.0266*** -0.0272*** -0.0200*** -0.0176*** -0.0184***
(0.00478) (0.00407) (0.00524) (0.00441) (0.000893) (0.000882)
4 hires -0.0608*** -0.0447*** -0.0437*** -0.0323*** -0.0208*** -0.0215***
(0.00577) (0.00500) (0.00617) (0.00523) (0.000995) (0.000977)
5+ hires -0.0756*** -0.0591*** -0.0468*** -0.0372*** -0.0386*** -0.0391***
(0.00569) (0.00518) (0.00541) (0.00458) (0.000633) (0.000619)
Detailed Worker and Job Controls No Yes No Yes No Yes
Observations 5,040,655 5,040,628 5,040,655 5,040,628 5,040,655 5,040,628
R-Squared 0.466 0.562 0.540 0.613 0.841 0.845
Notes: The dependent variable is the log of the hourly wage bid. Robust standard errors are clustered by employer. All specifications contain a spline for the 
applicant's arrival order, detailed job category fixed effects, calendar time fixed effects at the monthly level, and expected duration of the job by required 
hours-per-week fixed effects. Specifications with detailed worker and job controls also include the following about the worker:  a third-order polynomial of 
the worker's feedback score, a dummy for good reported English skills in the worker's resume, a dummy for a BA degree or higher, a dummy for having no 
prior work experience, a dummy for agency affiliation and for its interaction with having no prior work experience, the number of prior jobs, the log of the 
wage received on the last hourly job, and an indicator that no last wage is displayed when the worker is experienced. The detailed job controls in these 
specifications include: a third-order polynomial in the number of characters in the job description, and an indicator that the employer initiated contact with 
the worker.
Table 7: Outcomes over Entire Relationship (Including Future Contracts) by Employer Experience on First Hire
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
On relationships where the employer has made 1 hire -0.0674*** -0.0982*** -0.00105 -0.000239 0.0243* 0.0312**
(0.0175) (0.0169) (0.00200) (0.00199) (0.0131) (0.0131)
2 hires -0.117*** -0.170*** -0.00286 -0.00135 -0.000618 0.0126
(0.0200) (0.0194) (0.00224) (0.00224) (0.0152) (0.0152)
3 hires -0.110*** -0.168*** -0.00214 -0.000374 0.0157 0.0304*
(0.0222) (0.0215) (0.00247) (0.00247) (0.0166) (0.0166)
4 hires -0.116*** -0.176*** -0.00519** -0.00323 0.0399** 0.0562***
(0.0246) (0.0240) (0.00263) (0.00263) (0.0180) (0.0179)
5+ hires -0.0992*** -0.205*** -0.00523*** -0.00156 0.120*** 0.152***
(0.0128) (0.0125) (0.00141) (0.00142) (0.00943) (0.00948)
Constant 3.033*** 3.094*** 0.0425*** 0.0404*** 4.303*** 4.285***
(0.00993) (0.00982) (0.00116) (0.00115) (0.00781) (0.00785)
Expected Job Duration Category Fixed Effects No Yes No Yes No Yes
Observations 118,772 118,772 127,120 127,120 87,179 87,179
R-squared 0.001 0.057 0.000 0.003 0.003 0.011
Log Total Hours Over all 
Employer-Worker Contracts
Indicator that Worker Ever 
Receives Higher Compensation 
on Any Contract
Maximum Feedback Score 
over the Relationship if 
Feedback is Given
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses.  The unit of analysis is a worker-employer pair at the time of first hire.  The dependent variable in each column 
includes all future contracts for the pair. Observation counts differ between Columns 1-2 and 3-4 due to some contracts lacking recorded hours. Counts differ in 
latter columns because ongoing jobs and jobs where no feedback was given are excluded from the feedback calculation.
Table 8: Log Wage Bids and Observable Employer Feedback
OLS OLS
Employer Fixed 
Effects
Employer Fixed 
Effects
Worker Fixed 
Effects
Worker Fixed 
Effects
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Panel A: Feedback the Employer Left for Workers
On posts after making 1+ hires -0.0563*** -0.0817*** -0.0805*** -0.0636*** -0.0453*** -0.0447***
(0.00342) (0.00671) (0.00519) (0.00436) (0.00402) (0.00397)
1+ hires and no observable feedback left 0.0448*** 0.0595*** 0.0481*** 0.0221*** 0.0206***
(0.00588) (0.00446) (0.00377) (0.00352) (0.00347)
1+ hires and good observable feedback left 0.0242*** 0.0245*** 0.0212*** 0.0106** 0.0103**
(0.00765) (0.00574) (0.00487) (0.00473) (0.00467)
Detailed Worker and Job Controls No Yes No Yes No Yes
Observations 5,019,235 5,019,235 5,019,235 5,019,208 5,019,235 5,019,208
R-Squared 0.491 0.591 0.564 0.640 0.857 0.861
Panel B: Feedback Left for the Employer
On posts after making 1+ hires -0.0563*** -0.0868*** -0.0549*** -0.0432*** -0.0523*** -0.0521***
(0.00342) (0.0112) (0.00737) (0.00645) (0.00713) (0.00701)
1+ hires and no observable employer feedback 0.0549*** 0.0267*** 0.0215*** 0.0343*** 0.0334***
(0.0110) (0.00726) (0.00640) (0.00705) (0.00692)
1+ hires and good observable employer feedback 0.0501*** 0.0289*** 0.0249*** 0.0287*** 0.0275***
(0.0111) (0.00774) (0.00695) (0.00711) (0.00698)
Detailed Worker and Job Controls No Yes No Yes No Yes
Observations 5,019,235 5,019,208 5,019,235 5,019,208 5,019,235 5,019,208
R-Squared 0.491 0.591 0.564 0.640 0.857 0.861
Notes: The dependent variable is the log of the hourly wage bid. Robust standard errors are clustered by employer. All specifications mirror those in Table 6 and contain the 
same controls as detailed in the notes to Table 6. Observation counts differ from Table 5 because, for some observations, the timing of the initial feedback cannot be 
classified as occurring before or after later job postings.  
Table 9: Platform Profits and Repeat Job Posting for Different Fee Schedules
Panel A: Percent Change in Profits Relative to 10% Uniform Fee When Employers Anticipate Future Fee Changes
Inexperienced \ Experienced Fee 5% 10% 15% 20% 25% 30%
5% -35.2% -19.1% -14.1% -17.8% -23.8% -33.3%
10% -13.7% 0.0% 2.0% -1.8% -9.8% -20.3%
15% 1.3% 11.4% 13.0% 8.0% -0.8% -10.7%
20% 9.9% 17.7% 17.5% 11.3% 3.8% -5.9%
25% 13.4% 20.4% 19.4% 12.6% 4.6% -5.4%
30% 13.1% 17.7% 15.7% 10.8% 2.6% -7.1%
Panel B: Percent Change in Profits Relative to 10% Uniform Fee When Employers Do Not Anticipate Future Fees
Inexperienced \ Experienced Fee 5% 10% 15% 20% 25% 30%
5% -38.5% -19.6% -8.0% -6.1% -5.9% -10.0%
10% -18.3% 0.0% 9.6% 13.8% 12.2% 7.9%
15% -4.2% 12.9% 22.1% 25.2% 23.9% 20.9%
20% 3.5% 18.1% 26.4% 29.6% 28.6% 25.3%
25% 7.6% 21.0% 27.8% 30.9% 30.5% 27.2%
30% 6.9% 18.6% 25.0% 27.8% 27.5% 25.0%
Panel C: Percent Change in Number of Employers Becoming Experienced When Employers Do Not Anticipate Future Fees
Inexperienced \ Experienced Fee 5% 10% 15% 20% 25% 30%
5% 19.3% 11.9% 5.2% -1.1% -6.6% -12.6%
10% 5.6% 0.0% -6.1% -11.7% -17.0% -22.2%
15% -4.8% -10.0% -15.3% -19.7% -24.7% -29.5%
20% -16.8% -21.2% -25.8% -30.0% -34.2% -38.9%
25% -27.0% -30.7% -34.9% -38.7% -42.2% -46.0%
30% -37.3% -40.6% -44.1% -46.9% -49.9% -53.2%
Notes: Simulations use the parameters from the last two columns of Table 4 and consider a different grid of fees that vary by employer experience. 
Panel A displays percent changes in total platform profits when inexperienced employers anticipate future wage bids as a function of experienced fees 
and the resulting markups induced by selection into job posting in the experienced segment. Panel B displays percent changes in total platform profits 
when inexperienced employers do not anticipate future fee and markup changes even though they are realized in equilibrium and affect the 
contribution to platform profits by experienced employers. Panel C displays the percent change in the fraction of employers who go onto the 
experienced sample as a function of different fees.  Selection into or out of experience happens because (i) inexperienced employers are more or less 
likely to hire in the first place as a function of inexperienced fees and (ii) are more or less likely to realize future surplus after hiring as a function of 
experienced fees.  See Appendix 4 for details behind these calculations and how transitions between inexperienced and experienced employers are 
calibrated.  
Table A1: Details about Resume Data
Full Sample Sequential, Arms-Length Sample
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min Max Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Log of Hourly Rate on Last Job (Zero for Missing) 1.11 1.19 -4.61 7.01 1.12 1.20 -4.61 6.62
No Last Rate Displayed 0.42 0.49 0 1 0.43 0.49 0 1
Self-reported Good English Skills 0.90 0.30 0 1 0.90 0.30 0 1
BA or Higher Degree 0.35 0.48 0 1 0.35 0.48 0 1
Number of Prior Jobs 5.44 10.99 0 266 5.35 10.85 0 266
Indicator for No Prior Jobs 0.39 0.49 0 1 0.39 0.49 0 1
Feedback Score (Including Zeros) 2.44 2.27 0 5 2.39 2.26 0 5
Feedback Score Squared 11.53 10.84 0 25 10.81 10.76 0 25
Feedback Score Cubed 53.43 52.80 0 125 49.84 52.06 0 125
Prior Experience and Zero Feedback 0.06 0.24 0 1 0.06 0.24 0 1
Agency Affiliate 0.32 0.47 0 1 0.34 0.47 0 1
Agency Affiliate x No Prior Jobs 0.08 0.27 0 1 0.09 0.28 0 1
Notes: This table provides summary measures for the detailed resume data used in estimation. The full sample has 5,040,791 
observations, whereas the sequential, arms-length sample has 3,014,561 observations. In the hiring probability estimation, fixed 
effects for country groups, job category, a spline for applicant order, an indicator for an employer-initiated application, and a time 
trend are also included. The log of the hourly rate on the last job is set to zero for applicants who have never been hired for hourly 
jobs.
Table A2: First Stage Regression of Log Hourly Bids on Exchange Rate and Arrivals Instruments Including Worker Fixed Effects
Sample
Inexperienced 
Employers
Experienced 
Employers
Inexperienced 
Employers, Excluding 
Resume 
Characteristics
Experienced 
Employers, Excluding 
Resume 
Characteristics
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Log Dollar to Local Currency Exchange Rate, de-trended 0.119*** 0.135*** 0.131*** 0.175***
(0.00577) (0.00744) (0.00588) (0.00766)
Residual Log Applicants per Job Opening -0.0294*** -0.0205*** -0.0325*** -0.0205***
(0.00271) (0.00304) (0.00275) (0.00309)
Number of Observations 1,558,429 1,456,132 1,558,429 1,456,132
R-Squared 0.868 0.868 0.864 0.864
F Statistic on Excluded Instruments 153.1 103.1 178.8 154
Notes:  This table replicates the first stage regression table but includes applicant fixed effects. Columns 1 and 2, therefore, differ from 3 and 4 only by 
including time-varying applicant characteristics. See notes for Table 3.
Table A3: Log interviews per job opening fall with hiring experience
DV: Log Number of Interviews +1 OLS Employer Effects Employer Effects
(1) (2) (3)
One previous hire -0.0515*** -0.292*** -0.289***
(0.00576) (0.00773) (0.00772)
Two previous hires -0.0918*** -0.362*** -0.357***
(0.00657) (0.00928) (0.00929)
Three previous hires -0.114*** -0.406*** -0.401***
(0.00726) (0.0106) (0.0106)
Four previous hires -0.135*** -0.442*** -0.436***
(0.00786) (0.0114) (0.0114)
Five or more previous hires -0.177*** -0.520*** -0.513***
(0.00704) (0.0123) (0.0123)
Constant 0.893*** 1.121*** 1.110***
(0.121) (0.172) (0.177)
Includes job duration fixed effects and third 
order polynomial of job description length No No Yes
Observations 322,333 322,333 322,332
R-Squared 0.021 0.414 0.416
Notes:  Robust standard errors are clustered by employer. All specifications contain calendar time (year-
by-month) fixed effects, as well as job category and job duration fixed effect.
Table A4: Log Wage Bids Controlling for the Arrival Rate of Job Applicants
OLS OLS
Employer Fixed 
Effects
Employer Fixed 
Effects Worker Fixed Effects Worker Fixed Effects
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
On posts after making 1 hire -0.0247*** -0.0161*** -0.0180*** -0.0135*** -0.00961*** -0.0106***
(0.00339) (0.00290) (0.00382) (0.00320) (0.000638) (0.000626)
2 hires -0.0371*** -0.0252*** -0.0287*** -0.0217*** -0.0166*** -0.0170***
(0.00482) (0.00423) (0.00508) (0.00435) (0.000786) (0.000772)
3 hires -0.0345*** -0.0228*** -0.0279*** -0.0212*** -0.0171*** -0.0176***
(0.00474) (0.00404) (0.00519) (0.00435) (0.000891) (0.000881)
4 hires -0.0563*** -0.0399*** -0.0438*** -0.0328*** -0.0202*** -0.0206***
(0.00572) (0.00494) (0.00611) (0.00516) (0.000993) (0.000976)
5+ hires -0.0718*** -0.0551*** -0.0473*** -0.0384*** -0.0380*** -0.0383***
(0.00567) (0.00516) (0.00536) (0.00452) (0.000630) (0.000617)
Log Applicant Arrivals in First 24 Hours -0.0428*** -0.0483*** -0.0306*** -0.0363*** -0.00854*** -0.0123***
(0.00219) (0.00178) (0.00201) (0.00160) (0.000480) (0.000444)
Detailed Worker and Job Controls No Yes No Yes No Yes
Observations 5,040,077 5,040,050 5,040,077 5,040,050 5,040,077 5,040,050
R-Squared 0.467 0.563 0.540 0.613 0.841 0.845
Notes: The dependent variable is the log of the hourly wage bid. The sample is limited to worker-initiated applications on sequential job openings. Robust standard errors are clustered 
by employer. All specifications contain a spline for the applicant's arrival order, detailed job category fixed effects, monthly time fixed effects, and expected duration by hours-per-
week fixed effects. Specifications with detailed worker and job controls also include the following: a third-order polynomial in the number of characters in the job description, a 
dummy for good reported English skills, a dummy for a BA degree or higher, a dummy for having no prior work experience, a dummy for agency affiliation and its interaction with 
having no prior work experience, the number of prior jobs, the log of the wage on the last hourly job, and an indicator that no last wage is displayed when the worker is experienced.  
Table A5: Field Experimental Evidence on Log Bids by Employer Experience
Log Bid
Difference in Log Bid and Log Profile 
Rate
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Experienced Employer -0.222*** -0.205*** -0.305** -0.213*** -0.208** -0.246**
(0.0623) (0.0677) (0.127) (0.0785) (0.0828) (0.109)
Constant 1.406*** 1.396*** 1.425*** -0.0689 -0.0671 -0.0154
(0.0606) (0.0659) (0.0685) (0.0545) (0.0546) (0.0607)
Hours Control Included Y Y Y Y
Applicant Order Fixed Effects Y Y
Observations 128 97 97 97 97 97
R-squared 0.138 0.111 0.622 0.069 0.070 0.826
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses below. Experimental jobs were posted in March of 2015. Experienced 
employer refers to a job posted by an employer with past hiring experience in data entry and with good employer 
feedback. Otherwise, the job was posted by an inexperienced employer. The number of hours worked previously by 
each candidate, termed "hours control," was hand-collected by an RA. This information was not available for 
applicants who did not have publicly visible resumes, reducing the sample size.  
Table A6: Analysis of Bargaining by Employer Experience
OLS OLS
Employer Fixed 
Effects
Employer Fixed 
Effects
Worker Fixed 
Effects
Worker Fixed 
Effects
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
On posts after making 1 hire 0.00114 0.000378 0.000232 -0.00105 0.00525 0.00438
(0.00357) (0.00357) (0.00598) (0.00598) (0.00470) (0.00471)
2 hires 0.00319 0.00201 0.00878 0.00720 0.00472 0.00402
(0.00400) (0.00400) (0.00666) (0.00666) (0.00528) (0.00527)
3 hires 0.00216 0.000731 0.000334 -0.00163 0.00148 0.000442
(0.00445) (0.00445) (0.00733) (0.00734) (0.00599) (0.00601)
4 hires -0.00642 -0.00764 -0.00490 -0.00654 -0.00219 -0.00342
(0.00487) (0.00485) (0.00792) (0.00791) (0.00652) (0.00650)
5+ hires -0.0220*** -0.0221*** -0.00804 -0.0104 -0.0149*** -0.0159***
(0.00337) (0.00334) (0.00687) (0.00689) (0.00377) (0.00378)
Detailed Worker and Job Controls No Yes No Yes No Yes
Observations 61,958 61,958 61,958 61,958 61,958 61,958
R-Squared 0.018 0.024 0.402 0.405 0.353 0.357
Notes: Dependent variable is a proxy for the extent of bargaining, calculated as the log of the final hourly wage bid when the applicant is hired less 
the last log hourly wage bid on a rejected application for that candidate in the same job category to an employer with the same experience.  Robust 
standard errors are clustered by employer. All specifications contain a spline for the applicant's arrival order, detailed job category fixed effects, 
calendar time fixed effects at the monthly level, and expected duration of the job by required hours-per-week fixed effects. Specifications with 
detailed worker and job controls also include the following about the worker:  a third-order polynomial of the worker's feedback score; a dummy for 
good reported English skills in the worker's resume; a dummy for a BA degree or higher; a dummy for having no prior work experience; a dummy for 
agency affiliation and its interaction with having no prior work experience; the number of prior jobs; the log of the wage received on the last hourly 
job; and an indicator that no last wage is displayed when the worker is experienced. The detailed job controls in these specifications include: a third-
order polynomial in the number of characters in the job description and a dummy that the employer initiated contact with the worker.
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